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THE LAW OF CHOICE AND CHOICE OF
LAW: ABORTION, THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL,
AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION
IN AMER ICAN FEDERALISM
SETH

F.

KREIMER*

In American federalism, states differ among themselves in regulating morally contested issues such as abortion, sexual activity, and the right to die. Because of these
differences, Americans often travel to neighboring states to take advantage of legal
options unavailable at hom e. In this Article, Professor Kreimer examines the constraints that the American federal structure and the constitutional commitment to national citizenship place on states that would seek to limit their citizens' abilities to take
advantage of such options. Professor Kreimer first demonstrates that the constitutional
structure set in place by th e framers of th e Constitution and the fourteenth amendment
did not contemplate extraterritorial state regulation. He argues that although constitutional restrictions on ex traterritorial regulation have been diluted since the New
Deal, as a matter offederal structure and due process, states do not have th e authority
to forbid th eir citizens' extraterritorial acts when those acts are permitted by the moral
commitments of the states in which the acts occur. He th en shows that a state's efforts
to preempt its citizens' access to such options through restrictions on travel would violate the constitutional commitments to national union and national citizenship. Such
regulations are barred by the citizenship clause of the fourt eenth amendm ent, the commerce clause, and th e privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the
Constitution.

INTRODUCTION

A fragile five-member majority of the Supreme Court has responded
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsy lvania. A.B. , 1974, Yale University; J.D., 1977,
Yale Law School. This Article benefitted from the comments and criticism generously provided on earlier drafts by Ed Baker, Jim Blumstein, Steve Bradford, Lea Brilmayer, Nancy
Fuchs-Kreimer, Frank Goodman , Gerry Neuman, David Rudovsky, Stewart Sterk, Barbara
Woodhouse, and Linda Wharton. They have my deep thanks, though not always my agreement. Thanks is due as well for the fine research assistance of Seth Galanter and Charles
Goodwin. Responsibility for any errors of style or substance remains my own.
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to the challenge posed in Plann ed Parenthood v. Casey t by reaffirming
Roe v. Wa de after a fashion. 2 The fate of any particular regulation of
abortion now hangs on the joint evaluation of the three none too libertarian Justices who formed the Casey plurality as to whether the regulation
constitutes an "undue burden. " 3 The four dissenters in Casey announced
in the strongest possible terms their intent to press for the elimination of
all constitutional protection of reproductive choice; 4 they await only a
single vote to make their viewpoint the law of the land. In terms of federal constitutional protections for reproductive choice, the world of the
1990s bids fair to resemble mo;e closely the world of the 1950s and 1960s
than that of the 1980s. 5
In that world, national uniformity is unlikely. States like Utah and
Pennsylvania will leave no more room for choice on the abortion issue
than the governing federal law demands, while the fundamental laws of
F lorida, Massachusetts, California and New Jersey already provide
greater protection than the federal Constitution did even at the zenith of
Roe's constitutional protection. 6 The most recent estimates suggest that
l 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). In the interests of full disclosure, the reader should be aware
that I was a member of the counsel team for the petitioners in Casey, and remain involved with
the case on remand.
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
4 Id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5 For purposes of this Article, I assume that Congress will play no ac tive role. In the
present political constellation, neither proponents nor opponents of reproductive freedom seem
to be able to generate successful coalitions at the federal level. At the issue's core, neither the
Right to Life Amendment nor the Freedom of Choice Act have moved to the floor of Congress. See, e.g., Nat Hentotf, The Fading Freedom of Choice Act, Wash. Post, Sept. 12, 1992,
at A 19. President Bush indicated his intention to veto Congressional efforts to protect reproductive autonomy. President Clinton, by contrast, has proclaimed his support for abortion
rights. See e.g., E.J. Dionne, Abortion Rights Supporters Claim Election Gains, Wash. Post ,
Nov . 9, 1992, at A9; Ruth Marcus, At Issue: Abortion; On Support for Choice and Limits,
Bush-Clinton Contrasts Are Sharp, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1992, at A21 ; Elaine Povich, Clinton
Expected to Reverse Federal Policy on Abortions, Chicago Tribune, Nov . 7, 1992, at I.
A change in political circumstance sufficient to precipitate Congressional action on either
side might well obviate the issues I address in this Article. Obviously, if Congress uniformly
protects or prohibits abortions, as it has the power to do under current commerce clause doc trine, disuniformity no longer will be a difficulty. If it exerc ises the commerce power to protect
interstate choice, the statute will be dispositive. If, however, Congress sought to prohibit interstate choice, the issue of whether either the right to travel or the privileges and immunities
clause bind Congress would arise. Cf. White v. Massachusetts Council of Canst. Employers,
460 U.S. 204, 215-16 n.l (1983) (Blackmun, J.) (doubting whether Congressional authorization could render constitutional privileges and immunities violation); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (finding infringement of right to travel despite Congressional
authorization).
6 Massachusetts, New Jersey, and California provide constitutional protection for Medicaid funding of abortions . See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Meyers, 625 P.2d
779, 781 (Cal. 1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Mass. 1981);
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A .2d 925, 927 (N.J. 1982). The United States Supreme Court
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roughl y fifteen states are committed solidly to protecting abortion rights,
and an equal number are poised to limit or prohibit abortions to the extent that the federal courts allow, with the remainder mixed. 7 The withdrawal of federal constraint would leave a state-by-state patchwork quilt
of reproductive autonomy, if not, as in the regulation of alcohol before
and after Prohibition, a pattern in which regulations differ from county
to county.
In the years immediately preceding Roe, a similar patchwork of reproductive autonomy prevailed.8 In consequence, about 40% of all legal
aborti ons performed in the United States in 1972 were performed on
women outside of their state of residence. 9 Two years after Roe, only
earlier had rejec ted this position in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 ( 1980) (holding that
the Hyde Am endm ent, which denies public funding for certain med ically necessary abortion s,
does not viola te establishment clause of first amendment or due process clause of fifth a mend men t), and Maher v. R oe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (holding that eq ual protection clause
does not requ ire state participating in Medicaid program to pay for no nthera peutic abortions
when state pays for childbirth). Florida's explicit constitutional protection of privacy has been
held to bar parental consent requirements of a sort tha t would be upheld under federal standards. See In re T. W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1195-96 (Fla. 1989).
7 Na tional Abortion Rights Action League, Who Decides? : A State by State R eview of
Abortion Rights in America 143-46 (3d ed. 1992).
8 See Na nette J. D avis, From Crime to Choice 260-61 (1985) (s urvey ing abortion laws as
of A pril I, 197 1). According to Davis' survey, Alas ka, Hawaii , New York, and Washington
State were without substantial legal restrictions on pre- viability abortions. On the other hand,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oregon , South Carolina, and Virginia required that the continuation of the pregnancy "gravely
impair the ph ysical or mental health" or create a "substantial risk " to the "physical or mental
health" of the mother. Other states had more rigid prohibitions. See id. ; see also Carole Joffe,
Portraits of Three " Physicians of Conscience": Abortion Before Legalization in the United
States, 2 J. Hist. of Sexuality 46, 49 (1991) (characterizing period from 1880s "to the Roe era"
as one in which abortion regulations produced "enormous va riations from state to state, and
often even within states").
Even given a single legal standard, the application of the standard could vary widely. By
late 1970 in California, for example, under a "gravely impair" standard, 99.2 % of women who
ap plied for abo rtions were granted one, and "one out of every three pregnancies was ended by
a legal abortion." Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 94, 88 & n. *
(1 984).
9 N. Davis, supra note 8, at 228 & tbl. 10.1 (estimating that in 1972 43.8 % of abortions
performed outside state of patient's residence); id. at 11 9 (describing referr al " pipeline" from
M ichiga n to New York Ci ty, Michiga n women accoun ting for largest proportion of New
York's non-resident abo rtions) ; id. at 122 (describing profit-seeking out-of-state doctors flying
to New Yo rk City to perform abortions); id . at 199 (calculating that 63.4% of New York City
abortions from July I, 1970 to June 30, 1972 performed for out-of-state women); Jean Pakter
et al., Legal Abortion: A Half-Decade of Experience, 7 Fam. Plan . Persp. 248, 248-49 & tbl. 2
(1 97 5) (noting that, after New York liberalization, which too k effect in July of 1970, 131,172
of the 206,673 abortions performed in New York City in 197 1, or about 63 %, were provided
for out-of-st ate women; in 1972, 130,592 of 203,247, or approximately 64% , were for nonresidents; by 1974, 32,712 of 120, 829, or 27 % , were for out-of-state women, 15,562 of whom
were fr om Connecticut or New Jersey); Christopher Tietze & Sarah Lewit, Interim R eport on
the Joint Program for the Study of Abortion , 8 J. Sex Res. 170, 17 1 (1972) (noting that , for
1970-71 sample, 40% of all abortion patients were non-residents, with 88% of clinic patients
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13.4% of legal abortions involved women from another state, 10 and by
1977 the figure had dropped below 10%. 11 Even with legalization, however, local opposition and reluctance by local medical establishments to
provide abortions forced a substantial number of women to travel to obtain abortions. 12
Before Roe, supporters of reproductive autonomy sought to minimize the effect of hostile state law by setting up counseling and referral
networks that directed women to abortion opportunities in more sympabeing non-residents, as "defi ned by each [provi der] in terms of its customary area of service"):
Edward Weinstock et al., Abo rti on N eed and Services in the Unit ed States 1974-1975 , 8 Fam.
Plan. Persp. 58, 61 ( 1976) (citing Center for Disease Control report that, of reported abortions
where the patient's state of residence was known, 40% in 1972, 20% in 1973, and 10% in 1974
were performed on patients from another state).
The location of illegal abortio ns is harder to discern. Estimates of the number of illega l
abo rtions in the years before R oe range fr om 200,000 to 2,000,000 per year. N. Davis, supra
note 8, at 2 14; see also Lawrence Lade r, Abortion II: Making th e R evolution 20 & n.2 (1974)
[hereinafter L. Lader, Abortion II] (discussing estimates of 1,000,000 "secret" abortions per
year); Nancy Howell Lee, The Sea rch for an Abortionist 5 ( 1969) (discussing estimates rangi ng
from 200,000 to 2,000,000 per yea r) . Before legali za tion, doctors often sent patients for aborti ons in other states. See Joffe, supra note 8, at 59 (account of out- of-state referrals); L aw rence
Lade r, Abortion 53-54 (1 966) [h ereinafter L. Lader, Abortion I] ( 10% of ob/gyns surveyed in
1964 admitted referring patients to abortion providers, mostly in California, Florida, New
York, and Washington); id. at Ill (early account of doctors moving patient out of New Hampshire to obtain abortion). Obtaining an illegal abortion before Roe often involved for eign
travel as well. See, e.g., Joffe, supra note 8, at 50 (documenting referrals to Japan , Puerto
Rico, England, and Mexico); L. Lade r, Abortion I, supra, at 56-57 (1966) (noting many abortions obtained in Mexico and Puerto Rico).
10 See N. Davis, supra note 8, at 228 tbl. 10. 1 (43.8 % in 1972, 25.2% in 1973, 13.4% in
1974).
II Norah Henry & Milton E. Harvey, Social, Spatial , and Political Determinants of U.S.
Abortion Rates, 16 Soc . Sci. Med. 981, 987 (1982).
12 See Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope 191 (1991) (in 1973, 150,000 women traveled
out of state for abortions; in 1982, the figure was 100,000 women, and, in 22 states, 10% or
more of the women obtaining abortions obtained them out of state); Stanley K. Henshaw et a!. ,
Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 Fam. Plan. Persp. 63, 66-67 & tbl. 4
(1987) (in 1982,6% of all abortions, or 101,260 abortions, were performed out of state; and, in
198 5, 82% of all United States counties were without identified abortion providers); Stanley K.
H enshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in th e Ur.ited States, 1987 and 1988, 22
F am. Plan. Persp. 102, 105-107, tbls. 3 & 4 (1990) (in 1985, 6% of all abortions, or 88,820
abortions, were perform ed out of state; in 1988. 83% of counties lacked providers); Stanley K .
H enshaw eta!., Characteristics of U.S. Women Havin g Abortions, 1987, 23 F am. Pla n. Persp.
75, 80 & tbl. 6 (1991) (in 1987, 6% of all abortions or 90,830 abortions, were performed out of
state).
In 1985, 98% of abortions were performed in metropolitan areas. Arkansas, D elaware,
Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Rh ode Island, South Dakota, Utah,
West Virginia, and Wyoming had fewer than 10 abortion providers. Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, N orth Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington State had more th an 50 providers. California,
Florida, and New York have more than 100. National Abortion Rights Action League, American Women at Risk: A State by State Ranking ( 1992) (state-by-state analysis examining positions of executive and legi3lative bodies, restrictions on abortion, and number of in-state
providers).
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thetic jurisdictions. 13 The re-establishment of similar networks in the
next few years is likely. 14 As a first approximation, the late Professor
John Kaplan probably was correct in predicting that the elimination of
federal constitutional protection would reduce only marginally the total
number of abortions and that "[t]he marginal reduction in abortions
[would] come from among the very poor who are unable to afford transportation to states where the practice is permitted." 15 One should add,
13 See, e.g., Arlene Carmen & Howard Moody, Abortion Co unse ling and Social Change,
F rom Ill egal Act to M edical Prac tice 88 (!973) (describin g the C lergy Consultation Se rvice on
A bortion, which by 1970 was refer rin g 50,000 to 60,000 women per yea r for a bo rtions); id. at
25 (recountin g Service's practice of referring women to physicians in oth er jurisd icti ons) ; N .
Davis, supra note 8, at 6 1 (describing Michiga n refe rra l networks which referred women out of
sta te); id. a t 92-96 (describing private refe rra l netwo rk in volved with local organ ized crime);
id. at 133 (assertin g th a t Clergy Consultation Service involved 300 clergy by 1973); id. at 14041 (discussing Mic higan "clergy brokers" who refe rred wo men out o f sta te to avoid " police
surve illance"); id . a t 144 (explaining th at for- profi t referr al services in Michigan after New
York legalization " abso rb ed" 1/2 to 2/3 of Michigan " market" from Clergy service); L.
Lader, Abortion II , supra no te 9, at 24-26 (describing Lade r's referral ac tivities); id. at 27-28
(describing Patricia M cGinnis' referrals to Mexican doct o rs); id. at 42-50, 94-96 (describing
how Clergy Consultation Service was advised to refer wo men to out-of-st a te doc tors); id. a t 505 1 (describing Minnesota service ma kin g re ferrals to Canada and Mexico); id. a t 5!-53
(describing referrals by William Baird in New York); K. Luker, supra note 8, at 98 (describing
Society for Humane Abortion, which, durin g ea rly 1960s in California, referred women to
abo rtion providers in Mexico); id. at 122-23 (describing California referral netwo rk including
clergy in late 1960s); id. at 243 n. * (disc ussing evidence that Mafia considered entering the
abort ion field during 1960s); Bernard N . Na th a nso n with Richard N. Ostling, Aborting
America 42-44 (1979) (providing less admiring account of Clergy Consultatio n Service, claiming 1,200 counselo rs "at its zenith"); G. Rosen berg, supra note 12, a t 259-60 (by 1971, Clergy
Consult a tion Service operated in 18 states with a staff of about 700); Pa uline B. Bart, Seizing
the Means of Reproducti on: An Illegal F em inist Abortion Collective-How and Wh y It
Worked, 10 Qualitative Soc. 339, 339-40 (1 987) (describing counseling service es tablished in
1969 by Chicago Women's Libera ti on U nion, which evolved by 1971 into program which itself
provided illegal abortions).
14 See, e.g., Marianne Constantinou, Railroad a Ticket to Abortion, Philadelphia Daily
News, May 27, 1992, a t 3 (claiming that there are currently 300 volunteers in 31 states ready
to form "overground railroad" to provide transport,ation to states where abortion is legal); cf.
Jodi Enda, N .J. Centers E xpect an Influx from Pa ., Philadelphia Inquirer, June 30, 1992, at 1
(observing th a t referrals to New Jersey ex pected to avoid 24-hour waiting pe riod and parental
consent requirements in Pennsylva nia); Tamar Lewin, P a rent al Consent to Abo rti o n: How
Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. T imes, May 28, 1992 at AI (noting th a t Indiana aborti o n clinics
advise teenagers seeking abortions without pa rental co nsent to go to nei ghbo ring Kentucky or
Illinois, and that 100 teenage rs a mo nth ha ve sought abo rti ons outside Massachusetts to avoid
parental consent requirements of th a t sta te) .
IS John Kaplan, Abortio n as a Vice Crime: A Wha t If Story, 51 Law & Contemp. Probs.,
151 , 159 (Winter 1988) (footnote omitted); see also Ba rt, su pra no te 13, a t 341 (obse rving that
middle-class women seeking abo rti ons fr equ ently went to other states o nce abortion beca me
legal there, while " poor Blac k women" and oth er poor women continued to seek abortions
locally); N. Davis, supra note 8, at 199 (noting tha t non-residen ts ma king use of N ew York
abortion availability were 87.2% white, in contrast to in-state users, of whom 44. 9% were
white, and that " (o]ut-of-state travel costs prevented most poor mino rities from using the new
a bortion broker arrangements"); Carole Joffe, Physician Provision of Abortion Before R oe v.
Wade, 9 Res. in the Soc. of Health Care 21, 28-30 (1 99 1) (recalling th a t abortions before Roe
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in the interests of realism, that the marginal reduction likely would come
as -yvell from among women who are young, uninformed, dependent, or
otherwise vulnerable. 16 The narrowing of constitutional protections in
Casey is likely to be blunted in a similar fashion. The reduction in the
number of abortions performed will be limited and restricted to certain
segments of the population; most women in states with restrictive regulations who wish to evade the restrictions upheld in Casey will simply
travel to neighboring states.
This situation, I suspect, will be deeply unsatisfying to zealous abortion opponents . In the early 1970s, the U nited States witnessed numerous state efforts to disrupt referral networks. States prosecuted
counselors , 17 travel agents, 18 doctors, 19 and newspaper editors 20 who
were more readily available to women with resources or contacts, while "poor, young and
mi nority women" were "disproportiona tely ... vulnerable"); Tietze & Lewit, supra note 9, at
172 (non-resident women obtaining abortions more likely to be white than resident women
obtaining abortions) . In the most extensive study of pre-Roe illegal abortions, Nancy Howell
Lee concluded that " competent doctors make their services discreetly available to their middle
class patients and the informal networks circulate this information am ong peo ple similar in
background, while poor women find only nonphysicians or self-induced methods availabl e to
them ." N. Lee, supra note 9, at 168-69.
16 Cf. K. Luker, supra note 8, at 242-43 (predicting that "nominally illegal" abortion
would still be obtainable by those with "the right combination of money and informa tion");
James D . Shelton et al., Abortion Utilization: D oes Travel Distance Matter?, 8 Fam. Plan.
Persp. 260, 262 ( 1976) (noting that negative correlation between abortion rates and distance
from abortion facilities in Georgia strongest for black teenagers).
O n the barriers befo re R oe, seeN. Davis, supra note 8, at 163-70 (claiming that women
seeking abortions typically had to go through four intermediaries); N. Lee, supra note 9, at 155
(indicating that networks of contacts crucial for access to abortion). Survey data in Steven
Polgar & Ellen S. Fried, The Bad Old Days: Clandestine Abortions Among the Poor in New
Yo rk City Before Liberalization of the Abortion Law, 8 Fam. Plan. Persp. 125 , 125-26 ( 1976)
suggest that, at least among the women of childbearing age in poverty areas surveyed in 1965
and 1967, only 4% kn ew of a physician who could provid e an abortion. Of those women who
sought to terminate pregnancy only 2% used doctors, and 80 % attempted to terminate themselves. Id.
17 See, e.g., Landreth v. Hopkins, 331 F. Supp. 920, 921-22 (N.D. Fla. 1971) (involving
in vestigation and threatened prosecution of Tallahassee abortion counselors who referred
women for legal abortions in New York); People v. Orser, 107 Cal. Rptr. 458, 462-64 (CaL Ct .
."-.pp. 1973) (striking down conviction for offering to make arrangements for Mexican abortion); Commonwealth v. Hare, 280 N.E.2d 13 8, 139 (Mass. 1972) (prosecution of operator of
Cleveland abortion referral service for referring women to abortions in Massachusetts) ; Lefkowitz v. Wome n's Pavilion, 321 N.Y.S .2d 96 3, 964 (S up. Ct. 1971) (Attorney G enera l's effort to
subpoena abortion referral service's records in criminal investigation); State v. Abortion Info.
Agency, 323 N.Y.S .2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (granting injun ction against abo rtio n referral service), aff'd, 334 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1972); People v. Lovell , 242 N.Y.S.2d 95 8 (Oneida County
1963) (partially granting defendant's motion to access grand jury records in prosecution for
abortion referral); A. Carmen & H. Moody, supra note 13, at 55-56 (recounting Massachusetts' efforts to prosecute Ohio pastor for referring Ohio woman for abortion in Massachusetts,
as well as Michigan indictment of Illinois rabbi for referring Illinois wom an for abortion in
Detroit); L. Lader, Abortion II, supra note 9, at 74-76 (describing Massachusetts's efforts to
ex tradite Cleveland minister for referral to Massachusetts doctor); id. at 76-77 (detailing Michigan's efforts to prosecute Chicago rabbi for referral to Michigan doc tor using undercover
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provided information or referrals regarding out-of-state abortions. Contemporary European governments intent on limiting abortion have taken
the process a step further.
Ireland has sought to bar Irish women from leaving the country in
order to prevent them from taking advantage of more liberal abortion
laws elsewhere in the European Community. Its courts have enjoined
student health groups and women's health clinics from proffering information about legal abortion providers in England, 21 while Irish prosecuage nts and searches of rabbi's files).
IS Cf. State v. Bartl ett, 270 A.2d 168, 171 (Vt. 1970) (prosecution for transpo rting wo man
from Vermo nt to Montreal to obtain abo rtion); Ads for London Abortions St ir Legal Q uestions, N.Y. T imes, January 26, 1970, at 20 (effort by Massachusetts authoriti es to prevent
advertising by agency offering to arrange for transportation to and from abortion clinics in
England) ; Lawyer Pleads Not Guilty in Abortion Package Deal, N.Y. Times. Februa ry 3,
1970, at 40 (prosecution of that agency).
19 See People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 195-96, 206 (Cal. 1969) (prosecution of doctor who
referred patients to medical practitioners in Mexico and California for "conspiracy to com mit
abortion"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); cf. Kudish v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine,
248 N.E.2d 264, 265-66 (Mass. 1969) (revoking medical license of physician convicted for
providing an unlawful abortion).
20 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (reversing newspaper editor' s con viction); cf. A tlanta Coop. News Project v. United States Postal Serv., 350 F. Supp. 234, 238-39
(N.D. Ga. 1972) (striking down federal statute prohibiting mailing of any writing giving information as to how, where, or from whom abortion could be performed); State v. New Times,
Inc., 511 P.2d 196, 198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding unconstitutional Arizona's prosecution
of newspa per for publishing abortion advertisements).
I do not address in this paper the problem of private efforts to disrupt referral networks.
Depending on the resolution of Bray, only state remedies may be available, although pres umably out-of-state providers could invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. See Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 1070 (Feb. 25 , 1992) (No. 90-985), reargument ordered, 122 S. Ct. 2935 (June 8, 1992). Since the right to travel has no state ac tion
requirement, it might be technically possible to bring a Bivens action against private parties.
2 1 SPUC v. Grogan, (1989] I.R. 753 , 766, (1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689, 700 (Ir. S.C. D ec . 19,
1989) (granting injunction against student counseling); Attorney Gen. ex rei. SPUC v. Open
Door Counselling, Ltd., (1988] I.R. 593, 627 [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 443, 452 (Ir. S. C. Mar. 16,
1988) (confirming injunction against assisting pregnant women in Ireland from traveling
abroad to obtain abortions, including assistance in form of supplying the identity or location of
abortion providers).
In SPUC v. Grogan, (1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, the European Court of Just ice held that an
injunction against the dissemination of the location of overseas abortion providers by an Irish
student group was not an improper restriction on free flow of goods and services under the
Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community. On the other hand, in that case
the Advocate General expressed the view that a "ban on pregnant women going abroad or a
rule under which they would be subjected to unsolicited examinations upon their return"
would violate the Treaty of Rome as a "disproportionate" interference with free travel rights.
See id. at 875, 885. The judgment of the Court left the question open. The Advocate General
also suggested that the Irish prohibition would not infringe on free speech rights, see id . at 88384, but the European Court declined to reach the issue. Elizabeth Spahn, Abortion, Speech
and the European Community, I J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 17, 26 (1992).
The European Commission of Human Rights in Open Door Counselling, Ltd. v. Ireland,
7 March 1991 Application No. 1434/88 and 1435/88, expressed the opinion that an injunction
against abortion counseling entered by the Irish Supreme Court, (1988) I.R. 593, viol ated the
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tors unsuccessfully sought to prevent a fourteen-year-old rape victim
from traveling to England to obtain an abortion. 22
Some German authorities adopted a different tack under the former
West German abortion law, seeking to impose domestic criminal penalties on women for obtaining abortions in more permissive countries.
German border guards forced gynecological examinations upon women
reentering Germany at the Dutch border in the search for evidence of
extraterritorial abortions, while prosecutors brought criminal charges
against German women upon their return from abortions obtained in
other European countries with more permissive laws. 23
fre e speech guarantees of Article 10 of the European Human Ri ghts Convention. The judgment was based on a fa ilure by Ireland to provide adeq uate not ice. Report of The Commission
13 ; see also Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. at 882. The European Court of Human Rights recently held
that Ireland 's ban on inform ation about abortions in the U.K. violated Article 10 because the
restriction was dispropo rtio nate to the aim pursued. See Freedom to Receive and Impart Information Violated by Ireland, London Times, Nov. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File; E uropean Court of Huma n Ri ghts Court Rules for Pro-Choice Activists,
United Press International. Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
22 The Irish Supreme Court reversed an injunction prohibiting a fourteen-y ear-old rape
victim from traveling to England to obtain an aborti on. Four of the five members of the Irish
Supreme Court held that in this particular case, the dange r of suicide made the abortion one
that could be performed in Ireland itself. Attorney Gen. v. X, [1 992] ILRM 401 (Ir. S. C.
Mar. 5, 1992), available in LEXIS, Ireland Library, Cases File (opinions of Justices Finley,
M cCarthy, Eagan, a nd O' Flaherty). It appears, however, that the judgment does not loose n
the constraints on referral s in other cases, and indeed three of the Justices explicitly rejected
the proposition that there is a ri ght to leave the country to obtain an abortion that would be
impermissible in Ireland (opinions of Justices Finley, Hede rman (dissenting) and Eagan).
The Irish efforts have not eliminated foreign abo rtions. See Anthony Blinken, Womb for
D ebate, New Republic, Jul y 8, 1991 at 12 (citing estim ate by "France's Family Planning
Movement, a pro-choice group" of "some 15,000" Irish women per year receiving abortions);
Ki eran Cooke, European Diary, Ireland, Doubts Over a Small Dublin Hospital R ecall a Great
Poet's Warning, Financial Times (London), July 26, 1990, § I, at 2 (asserting that "many
thousands of . .. women travel to England each year" from Ireland to have abortions, and that
recent court judgments make counselors liable to prosecuti on); Chris Ryd er, Irish Torn Over
Abortion Ban on Rape Girl, Daily Telegra ph (Ireland), Feb. 14, 1992, at 4 (estimating that
6,000 Irish women per year travel to England for abo rtions); William E. Schmidt, Girl, 14,
R aped and Pregnant, Is Caught in Web of Irish Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1992, at AI , A 7,
Al3 (estimati ng that 4,000 Irish women per yea r travel to England or Wales for abortions).
There are also reports that thousands of French women per year also obtain ex traterritorial abortions. Blinken, supra, at 12 (estimating that almost 3,000 French women travelled to
Britain in 1989 to obtain abortions which would have been illegal in France).
23 See Debates, 1991 O.J. (Annex 3-403) 202-205 (Mar. 14, 199 1) (Debates of European
Parliament) (debate on resolutions condemning compulsory gynecological exam inati ons by
German officials of returning German women at the Dutch- Ge rm an border); id. at 203 (statement of Rep . Van Den Brink) (" over 6000 German women have had .. . abortion[s] in the
Netherlands"); id. a t 204 (statement of Rep. Keppelhoff-Wi echert) (defending searches on the
ground that officials "are required by the code of criminal procedure to investigate illegal
abortions of this kind carried out abroad where there are gro unds for suspecting that such has
been committed .... ");see also Karen Y. Crabbs, The German Abortion Debate: Stumbling
Block to Unity, 6 Fla. J. Int'l L. 213, 222-23 & n.l03 ( 1991) (account of prosecutions,
searches, and examinations of returning German women); Nina Bernstein, Germany Still Di-
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In the United States, constitutional doctrine that developed contemporaneously with Roe put an end to such government interdiction. In
Doe v. Bolton, 24 the Court held that article IV' s privileges and immunities clause protected out-of-state women who entered Georgia in order to
seek abortions. Under article IV, Georgia could not prohibit doctors
fr om providing abortions to non-residents. 2 5 Two years later, in Bigelow
v. Virginia, 26 the Court overturned a Virginia newspaper editor's conviction for running an advertisement for a New York abortion referral service. Because the services were legal in N ew York at the time, the Court
announced, in an opinion from which Justices White and Rehnquist dissented, that
[t]he Virginia Legislature could not have regulated the advertiser's activity in New York, and obviously could not have proscribed the activity in that state .... Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from
traveling to New York to obtain those services, or, as the state conceded, prosecute them for going there. Virginia possessed no authority
to regulate the services provided in New York . ... 27
vided on Abortion, Newsday (New York), March II, 1991, at 5 (providing account of German
woman returning from Netherlands who was forced to submit to vaginal examination at Catholic hospital near border and charged with illegal abortion; noting that study by Max Planck
Institute finds that such "inquisitions" are "standard practice"). The European Parliament
condemned the searches and resolved that "the internal borders of the European Community
may not be used to threaten citizens with prosecution for activities that are perfectly legal in
some Members States but not in others. " Resolution on Compulsory Gynecological Examinations at the Dutch-German Border of March 14, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 106) 113.
Because the national German prohibition on abortion was administered with varying degrees of stringency by state authorities, over half of the women who obtained abortions in West
Germany before German reunification travelled out of their own states to obtain abortions in
more liberal jurisdictions. Michael G. Mattern, German Abortion Law: The Unwanted Child
of Reunification, 13 Loyola L. A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 643, 686 & n.360 (1991). With reunification , the decision to retain East Germany's substantially more permissive abortion law within
the old East German borders provided the option of travelling to East Germany as well. I d. at
686; cf. Tyler Marshall, Abortion Law Split Imperils German Talks, L.A. Times, August 28,
1990, at A4 (indicating that after unification, Christian Democrats sought to apply law of
place of residence to punish West German women who obtained abortions in former East
Germany).
The conflict in Germany may be ameliorated by the new liberalized uniform abortion law
which the unified German legislature has adopted, although conservatives have vowed to challenge the law. Tamara Jones, Abortion is Legalized in Germany, L.A. Times, June 26, 1992,
at AIO.
24 410 U. S. 179, 200 (1973).
25 See id. The Court also adverted to the right to travel relied on in Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S . 618, 629-31 (1969). See id.
26 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
27 Id. at 822-24 (citations omitted). Professor Donald Regan, in Siamese Essays: (I) CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1865, 1907 ( 1987) [hereinafter Regan, Siamese
Essays], seeks to treat these statements as dicta, asserting that "there is no ground for claiming
[Justice Blackmun's] actual argument depends on such a premise ."
Characterizing the Bigelow principle as dictum is a dubious move. At oral argument in
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Bigelow might seem dispositive on the question of state interdiction
or prosecution of women 's travel to sympathetic jurisdictions.2 8 One difficulty with such a quick conclusion, of course, is that, under the Rehn quist Court, reliance on previous decisions has become a somewhat
hazardous enterprise. 29 More is at stake, however, than the vitality of
precedent under a new regime.
Justice R ehnquist's dissent in Bigelow accused the majority of establishing a "rigid territorial limitation" whose source was "not revealed"
and which was "at war with prior cases." 30 Bigelow has been criticized
as being out of step with modern thinking in conflict of laws, which tends
to recognize residence rather than territoriality as the primary determinant of legal obligation. 31 Working from what they regard as general
Bigelow, the state conceded under questioning that it co uld not regulate aborti ons performed
in New York. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Bigelow v. Virginia , 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
(statement of D . Patrick Lacy, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia). Not onl y did lower
courts treat the Bigelow determination as a holding in the year before Professor Regan wrote,
see, e.g. , Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Friends of C hildren, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 1221 , 1227 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (reading state statute so as not to permit ex traterritori al
jurisdiction of Florida legislature), but Justice R ehnquist in Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism
Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345 (1986), distinguished Bigelow from a limitat ion on advertising for domestic gambling on the grou nd that "the underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions [in Bigelow] was constitutionally protected and could not be prohibited by
th e state." As the Bigelow Court observed, the underlying for-profit referral services which
were at issue in Bigelow were subsequently declared illegal by New York, and were not themselves con stitutionally protected against regulation by New York. Bigelo w, 421 U.S. at 822
n. 8, 827. The only "constitutional protection" which serves to distinguish Bigelow is the protection against extraterritorial regulation of conduct legal where it occurs.
28 See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 160 & n.60 (citing Bigelow for propositio n that a state
cannot prevent its citizens from receiving out-of-state abortions "by inhibiting information as
to where out-of-state abortions may be performed").
29 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, IllS. Ct. 2597,2609-11 (1991) (declaring stare decisis less
compelling in constitutional than in statutory cases). A quick body count this Term finds
consti tutional precedent still standing after challenges in Quill Corp. v. No rth Dakota, 112 S.
Ct. 1904, 1907 (1992); Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 226163 (1992); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 ( 1992), Hilton v. South Carolina
Pub. Rys. Comm., 112 S. Ct. 560, 563-64 (1991); and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655
( 1992). Constitutional precedent was wounded, but remain ed viable, in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,280 8-16 (1992); and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2551
( 1992) (White, J ., concurring) (majority "casts aside long established First Amendment doctrine"). Cases which left precedent critically injured include: Foucha v. Lo uisiana, 112 S. Ct.
1780, 1791-94 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (accusing maj ority of "overrulin g without men tion '' recent precedent); New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2441-44 (1992) (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (majority opinion's rul e is inadequately supported, improperly applies prior test, and omits relevant cases); and Lucas v. So uth Carolina
Coastal Council , 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2904 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (majority opinion
remakes traditional rules of review and creates new rules).
30 Bigelow , 421 U.S. at 834 & 83 5 n.2.
31 It has not been uncommon for modern conflict of laws scholars to assert that a state has
unlimited authority over its citizens extraterritorially. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Equality and
the Conflict of Laws, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 893, 907 n.94 (1988) ("States may punish citizens for
criminal acts done outside the state." (citation omitted); Bigelow is the "only decision calling
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principles, at least two commentators have argued that if Roe were removed, there would be no constitutional obstacle to states' efforts to prohibit their citizen's extraterritorial abortions.J2
The reach of these arguments transcends the context of abortion.
As the Supreme Court withdraws from its position as arbiter of fu ndamental national values, we can expect a state-by-state patchwork to
into question the extraterritorial authority over citizens . . ."). This conclusion is compounded by the contemporary reaction against the territorialism of earlier conflicts methodology and the uncritical application of the international law principles which permit the United
States to apply its own law outside of national boundaries. As this Article will demonstrate,
the first element fails to take account of a strong tradition of American federalism which territorially limits state criminal authority, and the second ignores the differences between international and interstate relations under the American Constitution.
32 Professor William Van Alstyne, in his essay Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review
from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of Decision Merely Overruling
Roe, 1989 Duke L.J. 1677, 1684 n.27, takes the position, without mentioning Bigelow, that
"nothing in the constitution would hold it amiss" if a state sought to prosecute one of its
female citizens for an extraterritorial abortion. Professor Van Alstyne relies on Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238-39 ( 1945), which permitted a prosecution for bigamous
cohabitation to proceed against North Carolina residents divorced and remarried in Nevada,
who returned to live together in North Carolina.
Williams is not on point, for the cohabitation which formed the basis for the prosecution
took place within the borders of North Carolina. Id. at 227 n.l. Indeed, North Carolina
courts have long held that a statute seeking to punish a resident for a bigamous marriage
which took place in another state would exceed the constitutional authority of the state, and
impinge on federally guaranteed constitutional rights. See State v. Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d 497,
502 (N.C. 1977) (discussing long recognition of territorial limits on criminal jurisdiction of
state courts); State v. Ray, 66 S.E. 204, 205 (N.C. 1909) (bigamous marriage outside state not
indictable offense); State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 261, 264 (N.C. 1892) (state statute proscribing
bigamous marriage in another state implicates federal vicinage rights, privileges and immunities, and unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce). In response to the constitutional
limitations, North Carolina amended its laws to make cohabitation within its own borders the
basis for prosecution. State v. Herren, 94 S.E. 698 , 699 (N.C. 1917). Thus, if the facts of
Williams stand for anything, it is that the constraints of due process and federalism would hold
it very much amiss for a state to seek to prosecute for an extraterritorial act. See also Thomas
Reed Powell, And Repent at Leisure, An Inquiry into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom
Nevada Hath Joined Together and North Carolina Hath Put Asunder, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930,
994 (1945) (" N orth Carolina did not punish this couple for anything that they did outside of
North Carolina .
. North Carolina's statute does not forbid the getting of an outside divorce, and the unbiased sampler will find no flavor in the Court's opinion suggesting that
North Carolina has the power to do so.").
Professor Donald Regan in the course of a broader discussion of extraterritoriality, treats
Bigelow's protection as dictum, and announces his "stronger intuition" that "if Roe v. Wade
were overruled, states would be free to forbid their citizens from having abortions elsewhere."
Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 27, at 1906-12. Still other commentators differ on the
possibility of such an occurrence. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion, The Clash of Absolutes 127 (1990) (asserting that if the Constitution permitted a state to regard the fetus as a
baby, the state in which a woman conceived could forcibly restrain her from traveling to a
more permissive state to obtain an abortion) with Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal
and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
249, 260 (1992) ("[N)o state has yet tried to prosecute resident women who undergo abortions
out of state, or even forbid insurance coverage for such abortions, and perhaps none will.").
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emerge in other domains of contested morality. Where the contesting
moralities are deeply held, we can also expect efforts by each side to project its values extraterritorially . In the absence of constitutional constraint, not only may Pennsylvania prosecute its citizens for obtaining
abortions in New Jersey , but N ew Jersey might punish its residents for
hiring surrogate mothers in Pennsyl vania. 33 G eorgia could punish its
residents for tra veling to M issouri to engage in consensual sexual practices, while Missouri might interfere with its citizens' efforts to take advantage of a right to die in M innesota. 34 California could prosecute its
citizens for harassing women at abortion clinics in Utah, and Utah in
turn could press charges against Utah residents for smoking marijuana in
Al aska, or drinking ~lcohol and reading pornography in N evada. 35
There are, as I will demonstrate in this Article, profound objections
of constitutional practice and theory to such scenarios. 36 D espite the
claims of Justice Rehnquist and some modern commentators, Bigelow is
a case with strong found ations . T he tradition of American federalism
stands squarely against efforts by states to punish their citizens for conduct that is protected in the sister state where it occurs. T he F ramers of
the fourte enth amendment inherited a legal landscape in which a state's
sovereignty was limited to its own borders, and they established a supervening national citizenship which guaranteed the right to travel and to
take advantage of the legal entitlements of neighboring jurisdictions.
33 Cf. Susan Frelich Appleton , Surrogacy Arrange ments and the Conflic t of Laws, 1990
Wi s. L. Rev. 399, 444- 52 (concluding such prosecution would be an "unfamiliar, untested, and
perh aps constitutionall y problemati c experiment" ).
34 See In re Busalacc hi , No. 59 582, 199 1 Mo. App. LEX IS 3 15, at * 13-* 16 (Ct. A pp. Ma r.
5, 1991) (orde r prohibiting guardi an fr om transferrin g ward who was in persistent vege tative
state to Minn esota hos pital because of perception that he was doi ng so to avo id Misso uri's law
a nd remanding for furth er hearin gs), remanded , 199 1 M o. LEX IS 107, * I (M o. Oct. 16, 199 1).
35 Cf. Cap ital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S . 69 1, 694 ( 1984) (in valida tin g state regulation requiring cable television operators to delet e all advertisements for alcoholic beverage
ap pearin g in out-of-state signals retran sm itt ed within state) .
36 I fra me my arguments prima ril y in term s o f th e tex t, history, and stru c ture of th e Constitution. I leave for a futur e ar ti cle th e en terprise of elabo rati ng more full y th e th eo reti ca l
und erpinnin gs of th e constitutional argu me nt and th eir relation to the th eo ries of conflict of
laws .
Support for my position comes fr om unlikely sources. See, e.g., Brief fo r U ni ted Sta tes
A micus C uriae Suppo rting P eti tioners, Bray v. Alexa ndri a Women's H ealth C linic, cert.
granted, Ill S. Ct. 1070 C-l'o. 90-98 5) (Feb. 25), reargument ordered, 112 S. Ct. 2935 (June 8,
1992) ("For a State eith er to 'preve nt ' its citi ze ns from trave llin g to anoth er State, or to prosecute th em after-th e-fac t for makin g such a trip, wo uld directl y and purposefull y in te rfere with
th eir right of interstate travel . . .. ").
This Article also foc uses on th e qu estion of di rect prohibition of trave l fo r extraterritorial
abo rti ons, since the premise of th e Bigelow decision, at least as interp reted by Posadas, is th a t
prohibition of ad ve rt ising is impermissible because prohibiti on of extrate rritoria l abortio ns is
unconstitutional. H aving established th e arguments for the Bigelow premise in this Article, I
h ope to address in a future article the Bige low resul t an d the assoc iated first a mendment issu es
th at arise from efforts to interfere with referral networks.
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Modern cases have modified, but not eliminated, this basic scheme. Even
if the Court withdraws its protection of extra-textual constitutional liberties under the due process clause, that withdrawal does not vitiate the
obligations national citizenship imposes on the states. Indeed, if the
Court's decision to abandon protection of reproductive autonomy rests
on the ground that constitutional decisions must take account of the " relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right," 37
the Court, if it is to be consistent, must also defer to our traditions of
moral pluralism and mobility among states.
American citizens may be subject to different moral agendas in different locations. This is the essence of American federalism. But federalism does not entail a moral Balkanization, in which competing moral
agendas seek without restraint to conquer foreign territories; it should
not be a system in which citizens carry home-state law with them as they
travel , like escaped prisoners dragging a ball and chain.
This A rticle is divided into two Parts. Part I discusses the constraints that the structure of the American federal system and respect for
neighboring states impose on states that seek to regulate the extraterritorial behavior of their citizens. It examines the history of extraterritorial
regulation, beginning with a review of the strict conception of territorial
jurisdiction which accompanied the framing of the Constitution and the
fourteenth amendment, and which long dominated judicial review of
state efforts to regulate the extraterritorial behavior. It then traces the
dilution of these limitations from the New Deal to recent decades. It
concludes that, particularly in criminal cases, the principle that states
must respect the disparate moral commitments of other states regarding
behavior in neighboring territories remains intact. Efforts to prosecute
citizens for taking advantage of opportunities made available in other
states violate this principle.
P art II discusses the constraints on states that inhere in the constitutional commitments to national union and national citizenship. It argues
that state efforts to control the interstate movement of citizens and services in order to limit the ability of citizens to enjoy the full benefits made
available in neighboring states would be inconsistent with both the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.
37 P lanned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2874 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also id. (abortion "is not constitutionally protected- because ... the longstanding traditions of
American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed"); id. at 2876 (abortion cannot be
protected because it is conduct which has "long been criminalized in American society"); id. at
2859 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (fundamental right must be linked to the "historical traditions
of the American people").
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I
MORAL DISSENSUS AND TERRITORIAL JURISDlCTION
IN A FEDERAL REPUBLIC

A.

The First Republic and Territorial Jurisdiction

Moral dissensus is not new to America. The most prominent example in the period of our founding centered on the question of slavery.
From the origins of the Re public, disparate commitments regarding the
morality of slavery threatened national cohesion, and in tu rn were
threatened by it. 38 The equilibrium reached in the first period of American history apportioned each state moral sovereignty within its own
boundaries and obliged neighboring states to accede to that
sovereignty. 39
T he Constitution was framed on the premise that each state's sovereignty over activities within its boundaries excluded the sovereignty of
other states. The understanding that a citizen of one state venturing into
another state would be bound by the local law of that other state motivated the adoption of article IV's privileges and immunities clause; 4 0 it
was necessary to guarantee that the host would not use its exclusive
power to the detriment of visitors from other states in the Union . The
fugitive slave clause 41 was tacit recognition that, absent constitutional
constraint, local law could emancipate slaves who found their way across
borders whatever the rules in their home state. 42 On the other hand, the
38 In the Constitutional Convention, Madison contended "the States were divided into different interests not by th eir difference of size ... but principally from the effec ts of their having
or not having slaves." Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James
Madison 224 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter Federal Convention Debates]. See ge nerally Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union 22-40 (19 8 1) (discussing impact of slavery at Constitutional Convention).
39 SeeP. Finkelman, supra note 38, at IS ("The third option , which most states ultimately
adopted, was the enforcement of the lex fori (law of the forum) and rej ection of th e lex loci
(Jaw of the state of residence) of the slaves involved."); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Conflict of Laws 116 (1846) ("foreign slaves would no longer be deemed such after their removal [to free states]").
40 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. I.
41 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
42 Cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U .S. (16 Pet.) 539,612 (1842) (Story, J.) ("if the constitution had not contained [the fugitive slave clause,] every non-slave-holdin g sta te in the Union
would have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway slaves coming wit hin its limits");
id. at 648 (Wayne, J.) (absent fugitive slave clause, escaped slaves could be fre ed in North
(quoting Iredell, J., addressing North Carolina Convention)).
In the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinck ney first sought to qualify rights of the
host state under the privileges and immunities clause by including a protection "in fa vo r of
property in slaves, " an effort which was rejected. See Federal Convention Debates, supra note
38, at 545. He then, along with Pierce Butler, sought to insert the fugitive slave clause. Id.
This effort succeeded the next day. Id. at 552. See generally P. Finkelman, supra note 38, at
35 (discussing reasons why Pinckney and other slaveholders at the Convention would have
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extradition clause of article IV, providing that an accused who flees from
the state where a crime is committed be "delivered up, and removed to
the state having jurisdiction of the crime," ac knowledged that the sole
responsibility and prerogative for punishment rests with the state within
which the crime occurred. 43
T his limitation of jurisdiction to territory was more than a recognition of the structure of sovereignty. For statesmen who had claimed that
British efforts "depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of T rial by
Jury" and "transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses"44 were grounds for revolution, the right to be tried by a jury of
the vicinage-the place where the crime had been committed-functioned as a bulwark against tyranny. 45
been concerned about free movement of masters with their slaves).
43 U.S. Canst. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. Cf. Letter of James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Mar.
10, 1784), 4 Founders' Constitution 517 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("Unless Citizens of one State transgressing within the pale of another be given up to be punished by
the latter, they cannot be punished at all."). Madison was discussing the demand by South
Carolina that Virginia extradite a Virginia citizen for an assault in South Carolina; his assumption was that Virginia would have no authority to punish its citizens for extraterritorial
wrongs.
Professor Laycock argues forcefully that, as a matter of constitutional law, "state authority is in fact divided territorially .... State boundaries do what ordinary citizens think they do:
divide the authority of separate sovereigns." Laycock, supra note 32, at 320. As well as relying on political thought of the Framers and their opponents, id. at 315-16, he observes, inter
alia, that the prohibition in art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 of forming new states "within the jurisdiction of
any other state" equates jurisdiction with territory. Id. at 317.
44 The Declaration of Independence para. 23, 24 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 4 Founders'
Constitution, supra note 43, at 390; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (quoting
Declaration).
45 At common law, a crime could be prosecuted only before a jury from the county in
which the crime occurred. See William Wirth Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases:
Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 60-61 (1944); Drew L. Kershen,
Vicinage, 29 Okla. L. Rev. 801, 803 ( 1976). British threats in 1769 to extradite colonial
trouble makers from Massachusetts for trial in England drew immediate and unanimous outrage from colonial legislatures. For example, the Virginia House of Burgesses, in a resolution
passed in 1769, decried the practice as "highly derogatory of the Rights of British subjects; as
thereby the inestimable Privilege of being tried by a Jury from the Vicinage ... will be taken
away from the Party accused." Blume, supra, at 64; Kershen, supra, at 814-15. In 1774, the
Continental Congress asserted the "great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers
of the vicinage," and claimed that a British Act which authorized violations of the act occurring outside the realm to be tried "in any shire or county within the realm" deprived Americans of "a constitutional trial by jury of the vicinage." Continental Congress Declaration and
Resolves 14 Oct. 1774 in 5 Framers' Constitution, supra note 32, at 258.
According to Madison, it was the " uniformity of trial by Juries of the vicinage" among
the states which made extradition under the Articles of Confederation to the place where the
crime occurred palatable.
The tmnsportation to G[reat] B[ritain] seems to have been reprobated on very different
grounds: it would have deprived the accused of the privilege of trial by jury of the vicinage ... and have exposed him to trial in a place where he was not even alleged to have
ever made himself obnoxious to it.
Letter of James Madison to Edmund Randolph 4 (Mar. 10, 1784), 4 Founders' Constitution,
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The guarantee of a jury local to the site of the alleged crime was also
embodied in article III's requirement that, for federal offenses, "[t]he
trial of all Crimes ... shall be held in the State where said Crimes shall
have been committed ." 46 As the Supreme Court has noted, fears "that
Article II I's provision failed to preserve the common law right to be tried
by a 'jury of the vicinage' ... furnished part of the impetus for introducing amendments to the Constitution that ultimately resulted in the jury
trial provisions of the Sixth A mendment . ... " 47 The sixth amendment
now guarantees that "(i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " 48
The strains of moral dissensus survived the framing, and the constitutional pattern of exclusive territorial sovereignty came into play immediately. In 1791, Pennsylvania demanded of Virginia the extradition of
three Virginia residents charged by Pennsylvania with kidnapping a free
black man from within its borders; the victim was subsequently sold into
slavery. Against a background of abolitionist activity in Pennsylvania,
Virginia refused to recognize Pennsylvania's right to punish Virginia residents, even though the kidnapping had taken place in Pennsylvania. The
intervention of President Washington and the Congress, responding with
legislation that implemented the article IV extradition clause, ultimately
tempered Virginia's intransigence. 49
By the time of the Civil War, the territorial equilibrium remained.
In Kentucky v. Dennison, 50 a unanimous Supreme Court retained the
principle that the law at place of commission determined criminality, and
held that the principle worked in favor of slavery as well as freedom.
supra note 43, at 390.
46 U.S. Canst. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Article III also provides for cases in which the federal
crime is committed outside of state territory. This may either sim ply indicate that it was
contemplated that the United States would hold sovereignty over territory not within any
state, or that the nation, unlike the states, could expect to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
in international cases.
47 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970) (citatiO;JS om itted).
48 U.S. Canst. amend. VI.
49 See California v. Superior Cou rt, 482 U .S. 400,407 (1987) (describing the Penn sylvani aVirginia dispute). Accounts of the imbroglio are also contained in P. Finkelman, supra note
38, at 6; 2 John Cadman Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States 386-87
(1862); James Alexander Scott, Law of Interstate Rendition 5-9 (1917); Correspondence in 9
National State Papers of the United States 1789-1817, pt. II, 140-46 (Eileen Daney Carzo ed.,
19 85); William R. Lesli e, A Study in the Origins of Interstate Rendition: The Big Beaver
Creek Murders, 57 Am. Hist. Rev. 63, 66-76 (1951).
Although Virginia took the position that extradition was unnecessary because Virginia
possessed jurisdiction to punish its citizens for acts committed in Pennsylvania, United States
Attorney General Randolph responded that "[i]t is notorious that the crime is cognizable in
Pennsylvania; for crimes are peculiarly of a local nature." Leslie, supra, at 72.
so 65 U.S. (24 How .) 66 (1861).
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Faced with Kentucky's demands that Ohio extradite a free black man
whom Kentucky accused of assisting in the escape of a slave, the Court
held that Ohio's anti-slavery commitments failed to justify its refusal to
honor Kentucky's criminal law. 51 The assistance, though praiseworthy
in Ohio, was still criminal in Kentucky where it took place. 52 Article
IV's extradition clause, according to the Court, "included, and was intended to include, every offence made punishable by the law of the State
in which it was committed .. .. " 53
Although a state could enforce its morality within its own boundaries, it was not empowered to project that power extraterritorially to accompany its citizens. A Virginia citizen, although able to buy, own, and
sell human beings in Virginia, was not permitted to retain those slaves on
the territory of free-soil New York . The privileges and immunities clause
of article IV, according to the leading New Yo rk case, meant that
[a] citizen of Virginia, having his home in that State ... has the same
rights under our law which a native born citizen, domiciled elsewhere,
would have . . . . But where the laws of the several states differ, a
citizen of one State asserting rights in another must claim them according to the laws of the last mentioned State, not according to those
which obtain in his own. The position that a citizen carries with him,
into every State into which he may go, the legal institutions of the one
in which he was born, cannot be supported. 54
See id. at 102-03.
See id.
53 Id. at 103; see also 2 J. Hurd, supra note 49, at 402 ("However contrary the act charged
may have been to the laws of the State making the requisition, it must also have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction."). The force of the conclusion in Dennison was somewhat
diminished by the further determination that this "d uty" was not judicially enforceable. Dennison, 65 U .S. (24 How.) at 107-10.
It is worth noting that the Dennison result is at odds with practice in international extradition , where the principle of "double criminality" requires that the acts at issue be punishable
in both the requesting and sending jurisdictions. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
280 ( 1933) (offense held extraditable although not a crime under laws of place of asylum because specifically made extraditable by treaty); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir.
1980) (tracing this requirement to Jay Trea ty of 1794).
54 Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 608-09 (1860). Cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539, 612 (1842) (Story, J.) ("if the constitution had not contained [the fugitive slave
clause,] every non-slave-holding state in th e union would have been at liberty to have declared
free all runaway slaves coming within its limits"); id. at 648 (Wayne, J.) (absent fugitive slave
clause, escaped slaves could be freed in North (qu oting Iredell, J., addressing North Carolina
Convention)); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 , 23 8-39 (1859) (slave manumitted by Mississippi
owner in Ohio would not be recognized as free by Mississippi law within Mississippi territory).
The opposite outcome in Lemmon would have paved the way for Lincoln's nightma re of
the Court extending Dred Scott to protect slavery in free states. See, e. g., P. Finkelman, supra
note 38, at 318-19 (suggesting that Lincoln had Lemmon in mind when discussing the "next
Dred Scott case" during political appearances in 1859-1860). While Finkelman believes that
had Lemmon been appealed, the Supreme Court would have reversed it, id. at 313, the
Supreme Court cited Lemmon with approval in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180
51

52
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At the same time, New York recognized that its ovvn power to defeat slavery ended at its borders. New York's judiciary, in People v. !Yferrill,55 dismissed a prosecution of two of its residents for selling into
slavery in the District of Columbia a free black man who h ad been "inveigled" into leaving New York. The court observed that " [i]t cannot be
pretended or assumed that a state has jurisdiction over crimes committed
beyond its territorial limits." 56 Any such assumption, the court noted,
would be contrary to the constitutional scheme in at least two
dimensions:
First. That this state, as a sovereign and independent member of the
confederacy, cannot protect its citizens beyond its territorial limi ts ....
Second [in view of the jury venue provision of the six th amendment,
and the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV,] [t]he penal
acts of one state can have no operation in another state . . . . Here,
laws are local, and affect nothing more than they can reach. 57

At the time it was announced, the conclusion of the New York court was
in harmony with virtually unanimous judicial authority in other states
reaching back to the founding of the Republic. 58
(1869), overruled on other grounds, United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
545-49 (1944), where it announced that "if ... the Constitution could be construed to secure
to the citizens of each State in the other States the peculiar privileges conferred by their laws,
an extra-territorial operation would be given to local legislation utterly destructive of the independence and the harmony of states." I d. at 181.
Indeed, fourteen years before Lemmon, in Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (IS How.) 591
(1855), the Supreme Court suggested, in a unanimous opinion, that a statute which affixed
legal obligations because "those who enter into such contracts are citizens of the state" would
violate the privileges and immunities clause. ld. at 594.
55 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 590 (1835).
56 Id. at 596. In language of some relevance to the theories advanced by Professor Van
Alstyne, the court continued: "[n]o one can contend that a citizen of this state, who is guilty
of the murder of another citizen in the state of New Jersey, can be tried for that crime in this
state." ld. at 601; cf. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622 (Story, J.) ("state sovereignty could not rightfully
act beyond its territorial limits").
57 Merrill, 2 Parker Crim. Rep. at 602-03; see, e.g., People v. Mosher, 2 Parker Crim. Rep.
195, 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (in holding that bigamy occurring out of state could not be
prosecuted, court reasoned that "[a]n attempt of the legislature to subject individuals to trial
and punishment within this state, for acts done without the territorial limits of the state ...
would be simply void"); People v. Gardener, 2 Johns. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (New York
cannot prosecute defendant for stealing horse in Vermont); People v. Schenck, 2 Johns. 479
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (New York cannot prosecute defendant for stealing gun in New Jersey);
cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 614 & n.3 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (construing 1817
New York case, Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817), to embody the
"principle that no state will enforce the penal laws of another ... " in refusing to entertain suit
for assault committed in California).
58 See State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 565 (1856) ("The laws of Arkansas have no extraterritorial operation. Each State possesses the exclusive power to provide for the punishment
of crimes committed within its limits, except so far as this power may have been surrendered to
the Government of the United States .... "); State v. Grady, 34 Conn. 118, 129-30 (1867) ("It
is undoubtedly true ... that the courts of this state can take no cognizance of an offense
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The Civil War and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

The Civil vVar and the adoption of the thirteenth and fo urteenth
amencLT1ents ended the national debate on slavery. Moral dissensus
committed in anothe r state . .
Th e general proposition [is] that no man is to suffer criminally for what he does out of the territorial limits . .. ."); Gilbert v. Steadman, I Root 403, 403
(Conn. ! 792) (prosecution in Connecticut for theft in Massachusetts dismissed as "out of the
jurisdiction of chi s court. " ); Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421, 424 ( 1862) (" [T]he criminal laws of a
State do not bin d, and cannot affec t those out of the territorial limits of the State. Each State,
in respect of the othe rs , is an independ ent sovereignty, possessing ample powers, and the exclusive right, to dete rmine, within its own borders, what shall be tolerated and what prohibited. ");
State v. Haskell , 33 Me. 127, 130 (i 851) ("The offense of embezzlement and all other offenses
are pu nishable onl y in th e Sta te, within whose jurisdiction they have been committed.");
G ordon v. State, 6. iV.[o . 375, 376 (1836) (prosecution for challenge to fight duel dismissed
because of lack of evidence that offense was committed within the state); State v. Wyckoff, 31
N.J.L. 65, 69 -70 (1864) (on "general and recognized principles of law," defendant who commission s theft in New Jersey from New York cannot be prosecuted in New Jersey since the
defendant "czm only be punished by the authority of the state of New York, to whose sovereignty alone he was subject at the time .... "); State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499, SO 1-03 ( 1859)
(murder committed in New York cannot be prosecuted in New Jersey; New Jersey statute
authorizing prosecution for murder committed in New York "would necessarily be void" since
"[t]he act was a crime against [New York's] sovereignty .... [t]hat was supreme within its
territorial limits and in its ve ry nature, and in fact is exclusive .... We may exercise jurisdiction over the wastes of ocean or of land, but we must necessarily stop at the boundary of
another."); Sta te v. Kn ight, 1 N.C. (1 Tay.) 44, 45 (1799) ("Crimes and misdemeanors committed with the limits of each are punishable only by the jurisdiction of the state in which they
arise."); Simpson v. State, 23 Tenn. (I Hum.) 456, 462-63 (1844) ("The state authority is.
omnipotent and co-extensi ve with the limits of the State but no further . So soon as this boundary is passed, another rule of action, based upon a different authority, the sovereign power of
another State, springs into existence, exercising its control over a different section of country,
unrestricted and uncontrolled by that of the other."); cf. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
627, 65 5 (1829) (" The legislative and judicial authority of New Hampshire were bounded by
the territory of that state and could not be rightfully exercised to pass estates lying in another
state."); Commonwealth v. VanTuyl, 58 Ky. (I Met.) I, 4 (1858) (noting that, where fraud
was begun in Ohio and consummated in Kentucky, Kentucky had jurisdiction because the
crime "was committed therefore in this State ... ");Commonwealth v. Uprichard, 69 Mass. (I
Gray) 434, 439 ( 1855) ("Laws to punish crimes are essentially local, and limited to the boundaries of the state prescribing them ."); State v. Lord, 16 N.H. 357, 359 (1 844) (stating that, if
erection of dam in Maine had been the offense, prosecution would fail because it "would have
been committ-ed without the jurisdiction of the court").
T yler v. People, 8 Mich. 320 (1 860), is sometimes cited as contrary early authority. In
fact, the case merely held that a state could punis h extraterritorial acts which took effect
within the state. See id. at 333-34 ("[T]he crime, though commenced in Canada was consummated in Michigan .... H ad death not ensued, he would have been guilty of an assault and
battery ... and would have been criminally accountable to the laws of Canada only."); cf. id.
at 342 (Campbeli , J., dissenting) ("I do not conceive that any state of this Union has any such
extraterritorial power over its citizens.").
State ex rei. Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 422 (1863), which is cited for the claim that
American state jurisdictions, like English, have long recognized extraterritorial jurisdiction
over citizens, stands virtually alone in its time. In the course of upholding the right of Wisconsin to authorize Union soldiers to vote in state and federal elections while serving in the Civil
War, the case announced in dicta that Wisconsin could punish the filing of illegal absentee
ballots. Id. at 446- 47. The pressure of Republican self-interest in such a situation is palpable.
M oreover, Chandler relied on the proposition that, like treason, illegal voting was "peculiarly
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among the states, however, continued. During the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court continued to draw tight
boundaries around states' endeavors to project their public moralities
into other states.
In the year that the fourteenth amendment was enacted, Thomas
Cooley articulated the received wisdom that, as a matter of constitutional
structure,
[t]he legislative authority of every state must spend its force within the
territorial limits of the State. The legislature of one State cannot make
Jaws by which people outside the State must govern their actions ....
It cannot provide for the punishment as crimes of acts committed beyond the State boundary .... 5 9

Within a decade after the fourteenth amendment's adoption, the
Supreme Court began to read these territorial restrictions into the definition of due process. 60 At the state level, courts likewise continued to
view state criminal authority as limited to acts that occurred or reached
fruition within the prosecuting state. 61
injurious to" the rights of the sovereign. Id. at 444.
The only antebellum case I have found upholding a strictly extraterritorial prosecution is
Commonwealth v. Gaines, 2 Va. Cas. 172 (1819), which by a 4-3 opinion rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute asserting extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 182. That
assertion of jurisdiction had already been repealed at the time the case was argued. See id. ; I
Rev. Code of Laws of Va. ch. 162 Para. 8 (I 819) (limiting jurisdiction to crimes "committed at
any place in this Commonwealth").
59 Thomas Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 127-28 (1868); see also David
Rorer, American Inter-State Law 228 (Levy Mayer ed., reprint 1983) (relying both on extradition clause and on colonial hostility to being tried in England).
Justice Scalia repeatedly has suggested that the understanding that prevailed at the tim e
of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment should be given substantial weight in construing
the reach of legitimate state power. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611
( 1990) (in defining due process under fourteenth amendment, "crucial time" for determining
legality of jurisdiction was 1868); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989)
(purpose of due process clause is "to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside
importan t traditional values"); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 , 724-27 ( 1987) (arguing
that, for full faith and credit purposes, statute of limitation s questions should be answered
using historical context at time Constitution was adopted as a guide a nd that issue is wh ether
"the society which adopted the Constitution" regarded practice as acceptable); id. at 730
(maintaining that for due process purposes as well, courts should look to the "tradition in
place when the constitutional provision was adopted").
60 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) ("[E]very state possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory .... [and] no state
can exercise direct jurisdiction and auth ority over persons or property without its territory.
The several States are of equal dignity and authority and the independence of one implies th e
exclusion of power from all others.").
61 See, e.g., Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413, 415 (1875) (stating that " it is settled ... that
[appellant] cannot be ... convicted and punished" in one state for a crime committed within
another state); In re Carr, 28 Kan. I, 5-6 (1882) (holding that Kansas cannot prosecute for
extraterritorial forgery); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W. 365, 365 (Ky. 1887) (dismissing
prosecution for extraterritorial bigamy because second marriage "like any other criminal act,

l
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By the turn of the century, the Court established, as a command of
the due process clause, the principle that states could not legislate extraterritorially-even with respect to their own citizens. In 1892, the Court
gave controlling effect to the maxim that "crimes are in their nature local
and the jurisdiction of crimes are local" because "[l]aws have no force of
themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts them . . .. " 62
Five years later, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 63 the Court addressed a statute
by which Louisiana sought to punish one of its ci tizens for entering into
an out-of-state insurance contract. A unanimous opinion rejected the
claim that the penalty was necessary to save the "sovereignty of the
state" from "mockery" by "compel[ling] its citizens to respect its
laws." 64 The statute violated due process because it " prohibits an act
which under the federal constitution the defendants had a right to perform. " 65 The state's power "does not and cannot extend to prohibiting a
citizen from making contracts . . . outside the limits and jurisdiction of
the state. " 66
must transpire here in order to be subject to indictment and punishment"); W. Transp. & Coal
Co. of Mich. v. Kilderhouse, 87 N.Y. 430, 435 ( 1882) (invoking principle that "(i]t is very well
settled tha t penal laws have no extra-territorial force" in deciding that usury statute has no
effect on extraterritorial contract); Ormes v. Dauchy, 82 N.Y. 44 3,448 (1 880) (rea ffirming that
New York legisl ature has no extraterritorial jurisdiction over contract to advertise lotteries
legal in place of advertisement); State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 26 1, 265 (N.C. 1892) (statute punishing extraterritorial bigamy by citizen unconstitution al); State v. Mitchell, 83 N.C. 674, 676
(1880) (dismissing charges for ex tra territorial assa ult and battery since " [t]he courts of this
state have jurisdiction only of offenses committed within its territori al boundaries"); State v.
Stuart, 92 S.W. 878 (Mo. 1906) (statute construed not to punish act of extraterritorial bigamous marriage "which of course is punishable in the state where it occurs," but only to punish
subsequent cohabitation within state); State v. Gritzner, 36 S.W. 39, 41 (Mo. 1896) (dismissing
prosecution of ex traterritorial gaming, reaso ning that state cannot constitutionally "provide
for the punishment, as crimes, of acts committed beyond the state boundary" (quoting Justice
Cooley)); cf. State v. Morrow, 18 S.E. 853, 860 (S.C. 1893) (although "none will dispute" the
proposition that "the legislature of this State cannot define and puni sh crimes committed in
another state," sending abortifacient from Washington to woman in South Carolina produced
effect in South Carolina which could be punished).
62 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1 892); see also id . at 681 (citing rule of international law that "breaches of public law ... were only cognizable and punishable in the country
where they were committed"). The issue at stake in Auri/1 was ac tuall y whether the full faith
and credit clause required Maryland to take cognizance of an allegedly pen al judgment entered
in New York under New York law against a Canadian ci tizen . See id. at 666.
63 165 U.S. 578 (1 89 7).
64 Id. at 585 (reciting opinion of Louisiana Supreme Court).
65 Id. at 591.
66 Id. The Court distinguished Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1 89 5), on th e ground
that H ooper involved an agent who brokered foreign in sura nce contrac ts within the territo rial
jurisdiction of California, see A!!geyer, 165 U.S. at 587, and that Hooper assumed that an effort
to regulate contracts by citizens " beyond (the] confines of the state" would be unconstitutional.
Hooper, 155 U .S. at 659.
Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 558 (1902), reaffirmed this distinction by upholding a prohibition on the domestic activities of brokers for out-of-state insurance, emphasizing
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In several post-Allgeyer cases the Court affirmed the states' power to
punish "acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it. " 67 The principle that state legislation seeking to control extraterritorial actions violates due process,
however, remained controlling through the first third of the twentieth
century. 68
the "vital distinction between acts done within and acts done beyond a state's jurisdiction."
Sec also New York, Lake Erie and W. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628, 646 (1894)
(holding that Pennsylvania had no power to compel corporation doing busin ess in the state to
co l:ect money from bond-holders in New York); Crutcher v. Kentuck y, 141 U.S. 4 7,61 (1 891)
(s tating that "w hen the commercial power of Congress ... or some other exc lusive power of
the federal gove rnment, is not in question, the poiice power of the state extends to almost
e·;,crything within its borders") .
6 7 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620, 624 (1927) (quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221
U .S. 280, 285 ( 1911) (holding that extraterritorial conspiracy to import liquor into United
Stiltes is within United States jurisdiction)); see also Strassheim v. Dail y, 221 U.S. 280 , 285
( 1911) (concerning extraterritorial scheme directed to defraud state government on bids within
the state).
This exception is perhaps inconsistent with strict common law territorialism based on the
limits of sovereign power. However, if the theory of the territorial limitati on of criminal law is
based on the heritage construing crimes as acts against "the king's peace," guaranteed to those
wit hin the realm, it is perfectly sensible to view acts which come to fruiti on within the territory
as interfering with the sovereign interests of the state. The prospect of al lowing a defend ant to
bombard the receiving state with impunity from over the state line was simply unacceptab le in
a country containing automobiles, telephones, and railroads.
A sufficiently broad conception of in-state "effects" would, of course, eliminate all territor ial !imitation on jurisdiction: every action by a citizen is likely to have some distant reperc ussions back in her home state. An understanding which permits the non-existence within Ne w
Jersey of a murder victim who would exist but for a murder in Pennsylvania, the existence
within New Jersey of a woman who had committed an immoral act in Delaware, or the effect
on citizens of New Jersey of the knowledge that persons outside of New Jersey can contract as
surrogate mothers to count as "effects" justifying punishment by New Jersey would relega te
t he territorial limitation to impotence. The cases which have recognized local effects, however,
have relied on intended and much more palpable physical or economic impacts.
In Hyatt v. People ex rei. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 719 (1903), the Court held that ex tradition under article IV required proof that the accused "was in fact within the demanding State
at the time when the alleged crime was committed," and that an alleged fugitive who had reentered Tennessee after the alleged crime could not be extradited where there was "no ev ide nce or claim that he then committed any act which brought him within the criminal law of
the State of T ennessee." Note, however, that the Court acknowledged th at the "ex ercise of
jurisdiction by a State to make an act committed outside its borders a crim e against the State"
is another issue. Id. at 712.
68 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930) (holding that T exas cannot affect the
terms of a contract entered into by Texas res ident in Mexico without violating due process);
Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 435 (1926) (striking down a statute seeking to
prohibit out-of-state payments by corporations doing business in New Mexico); Saint Louis
Cotton Compress Co. v. A rkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 349 (1922) (striking down a statute imposing
a tax upon persons placing insurance extraterritorially); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246
U .S. 357, 376-77 (1918) (holding that state cannot control contract entered into by resident
and fore ign corporation in foreign state); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161
(1914) ("[I]t would be impossible to permit the statute of Missouri to operate beyond the
jurisdiction of that State and in the State of New York ... without throwing down the consti-
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The J'lew Deal Court and Extraterritorial Regulation

The principle began to erode by the mid-1930s. From one direction,
increasing academic skepticism under the banner of legal realism ate
away at the theoretical underpinnings of strict territoriality as a basis for
conflict of lmvs decisions. 69 From another, doubts about dual federalism
and the propriety of judicial value choice under substantive due process
undermined the principle that the Constitution implicitly constrained application of state law.70
T he emerging weakness of territorial limits was most sharply manifest in the international arena. In B lackmer v. United States, 71 the Court
rejected a due process challenge to a contempt citation issued against an
American citizen living in France for his failure to obey a court order
that required him to return to the United States in order to give evidence.
" By virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its
authority over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him
in a foreign country." 72 As the doctrine has evolved, the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States over its citizens is today constrained
only by a statutory construction requirement that extraterritorial juristutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within their orbits of lawful authority.");
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 543 (1914) (finding that state statute cannot
impose tort liability for acts outside of state territory in District of Columbia); cf. The Hamilto n, 207 U. S. 398, 403 (1907) (upholding extension of Delaware tort law to citizens domiciled
within the state with respect to actions on the high seas, "a place belonging to no other sovereign").
The Court also appeared to contemplate imposing similar territorial limitations to criminal prosecutions by the federal government. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. ,
213 U.S. 34 7, 355-56 (1909) (stating that generally "t he character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be de term ined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done") .
69 The proposition-underlying strict territoriality in conflict of laws decisions- that litigants are entitled to rights which "vested " in the state where the last relevant actions occurred
was dissected by the legal realists in the 1920s and 1930s. See generally David F. Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 H arv. L. Rev. 173 (1933); Walter Wheeler Cook,
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 457 (1924); Walter Wheeler
Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 368
(1931 ); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale
L.J. 736 (1924). The American Law Institute, however, retained the theory in the 1934 Restatement of Confl ict of Laws. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws: Foundations and
Future Directions 22-24 ( 1991) (discussing strong territorialist philosophy in First Res tatement of Conflict of Laws); Harold Korn, Th e Choice of Law R evolution: A Critique, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 772, 779, 807 (1983) (same); James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry
About Full Faith and Credit to Laws, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1304 (1987) (same).
70 See, e.g., David P. Cu rri e, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century
1888-1986, at 242-43 ( 1991) (linking decline of territorial ism, substantive due process and
emergence of the Erie doctrine); Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on Conflict of Laws 272
(1963) ("The choice between the competing interests of coordinate states is a political function
of the highest order, which ought not in a democracy to be committed to the judiciary.").
71 284 U.S. 42 1, 438-~·0 (1932).
72 Id. at 436.
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diction be asserted by a clear congressional statement. 73
At the same time, the extraterritorial authority recognized in states
expanded, though with a greater sense of restraint. 74 Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission 75 cited Allgeyer as good law, but
upheld California's use of its Workers Compensation law to redress an
injury that took place in Alaska by invoking the fact that the underlying
employment contract was formed in California. 76 In Skiriotes v. Florida ,77 the Court confronted the prosecution of a Florida resident under a
73 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am . Oil Co., IllS. Ct. 1227,
1235 (1991) (holding that United States discrimination law does not apply to discrimination by
American corporations in other nations); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 574-75 (1953)
(holding that jurisdiction exists over maritime accidents); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S.
280, 289 (1952) (holding that jurisdiction exists over trademark infringement in Mexico); cf.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (upholding kidnapping of Mexican
national to be tried in United States for conspiracy to torture United States government agents
in Mexico); see also Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1229 (1992) (account of rules on federal
extraterritorial criminal prosecution); Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 598, 655-62
(1990) (same).
An earlier version of the doctrine held that, at least as a matter of statutory construction,
"crimes against private individuals ... which affect the peace and good order of the community, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government where it
may properly exercise it," but that crimes against the United States government itself would be
enforceable against American citizens wherever found. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94,
98 (1922); cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (arguing
that cases immediately affecting national interests may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
over citizens).
7 4 In part this is a function of the fact that the Constitution generally has not played the
same limiting role in the assertion of United States jurisdiction as it has in the limitation of
state jurisdiction. See Lea Brilmayer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 Law & Con temp. Probs., 11, 24-26 (Summer
1987).
75 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
76 Id. at 550; cf. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 157 n.7 (1932)
(Brandeis, J.) (stating that the effect of Vermont workers compensation statute in denying
relief for injury sustained in New Hampshire was not illegally extraterritorial, because it "does
not undertake to prohibit acts beyond the borders of the State").
With respect to amenability to suit, the Court has declared
[a]s in the case of the authority of the United States over its absent citizens, the authority
of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from
the state .... [T]he relationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state .... One
such incident of domicile is amenability to suit ....
Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). However, as Justice Scalia has recently reminded
us, jurisdiction to adjudicate is not the same as jurisdiction to legislate. Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1923 (1992) (Scalia, J. concurring) ("I do not understand this to
mean that the due process standards for adjudicative jurisdiction and those for legislative ...
are necessarily identical; and on that basis I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion.");
cf. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. L. Rev. 1112, 1114 (1981) (arguing that, although concept of federalism is
properly considered a limit to application of laws, concept does not limit personal jurisdiction).
77 313 u.s. 69 (1941).
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Florida statute that punished sponge fishing in diving suits in the Gulf of
Mexico. Although the violation occurred outside Flori da's territorial
waters, the Court upheld the conviction, commenting that "[i]f the
United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas,
we see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the
conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respec t to matters in
which the State has a legitimate interest, and where there is no conflict
with acts of Congress." 78
Skiriotes made a point of the fact that the conduct in question occurred "on the high seas," rather than in some other state's territory; it is
far from a blanket approval of state extraterritorial jurisd iction. 79 Still,
at the close of the Court's New Deal revolution, the due process question
7 8 !d. at 77; cf. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 78-79 (1960) (stating that regulation
of fishing constituted "police power measures which a State can enforce against its citizens
beyond its boundaries").
79 There is language early in the Skiriotes opinion analogizing Florida's power to the authority of the United States government "in foreign countries." Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 73. That
language relies on the construction of federal power in Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421
(1932). The holding of Skiriotes, however, is carefully phrased in terms of conduct on "the
high seas." !d. at 77, 79. It relies on Holmes' opinion in The Hamilton , 207 U.S. 398 (1908),
and quotes the section which characterizes the conduct as "within no ot her territorial jurisdiction." Skiriotes, at 78.
The accepted wisdom on which Th e Hamilton was predicated was sketched by H olmes'
opinion for a unanimous Court in Ameri can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,
355-56 ( 1909): "No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas ... co untries
ma y treat some rela tions between their citizens as gove rn ed by their own law.
But the
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." (citing The Hamilton) . A
contrary rule would "not only be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of
another sovereign." Id. at 356.
Contemporary com mentators divide on the reach of Skirioies. Compare Brilmayer &
Norchi, supra note 73, at 1241-42 (" It is also fairly well established th at a state may regulate
its residen ts, even when they are acting outside the state. " ) (citing Skiriotes, but conceding that
"[!]ewer cases exist .... ") and Gergen, supra note 31, at 907 n.94 (statin g that Skiriotes stands
for proposi tion that "(s]tates may punish citizens for criminal acts done outside the state")
with Lea Brilmayer et a!., An Introduction to Juri sdiction in the American Federal System
326-27 (I 986) ("It is not clear, however, whether [Skiriotes J should be read so broadly.
Bigelow v. Virginia casts some doubt on a state's authority to regulate the activities of residents
while in other states."); Robert A. Lefiar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases,
25 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 44, 50 (1974) (maintaining that, in light of Skiriotes, "[p]robably
forum state citizenship alone would be too little [to all ow punishment consistent with due
process] if the defendant ci tizen's act were done in a sister state, so that the sister state's law
could be deemed to gove rn it"); James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of
Law, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 185, 197 (1976) (arguing that Skirioles relies on the fact that ac tivity
regulated is "not within the border of another sovereign "); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdicti on and State Criminal Law, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 761 , 781 ( 1960) (asserting
Skiriotes reasoning not applicable to interstate situation, and "shibboleth of territorial ity remains"); and Larry Kramer, Note, Jurisdiction Over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U . Chi. L.
Re v. 1431, 1448 n. 91, 1451 n. Ill ( 1983) (stating that application of Skiriotes to conduct within
another state would violate the full faith and credit clause).
No Supreme Court case has extended Skiriotes to conduct wholly within another state.
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for states had become in large measure the " reasonableness" of the state's
concern, not solely the territorial reach of the state's regulation. 80 While
doubts concerning the propriety of states' extraterritorial regulation of
their citizens have persisted, 81 the free-form evaluation of state " interests" casts doubt on the principle, dating to the republic's birth, that
states do not have the authority to project their moral judgments into
their neighbors' territory. 82
80 Some commentators tend to view Alaska Packers as an abandonment of constitutional
concerns with extrater ritoriality. See, e.g., Gary Simson, State Autonomy in Choi ce of Law: A
Suggested Approac h , 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 61, 62-64 (1978). This is something of a n exagge r:l tion.
The cou rts of th e 1940s retained at least a nominal allegiance to the extraterritoriality
principl e. The Court in Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940), upheld Virginia's insurance
regul at ions, emphasizing that "the qu estion is not whether what Virginia has don e will res trict
appellant' s freedom of action outside of Virginia by subjecting th e exercise of such fre edom to
finan cia l burdens, [but) whether Virginia has reached beyond her borders to regulate a subj ect
that was none of her concern because the Constitution has placed control elsewhere." T he
Court still felt compelled to distinguish Allgeyer, Tafoya, and St. Louis Compress . Id.
Likewise, in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943), the Court annou nced
that in "determining the power of a state to apply its own regulatory la ws to insuran ce business activities," th e crucial determinan t was "the protection of state interests" as judged by
"highl y realistic considerations," but aga in distin guished Allgeyer as a case in which " no act
was done in the state of Louisiana." I d. at 316; see also Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440,
461 (rejecting due process challenge to California's insurance regulations because "nothing
which California requires touches or affects anything the society or the appellant may do or
wish to do in Arizona or elsewhere than in California"), reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 8 18 (1946).
8! See FTC v. Traveler's Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 , 302 (1960) (noting doubts which
constitutional limitations might create as to Nebraska's power to regulate extraterritorial activity of Nebraska corporation) (citing Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 249
U.S. 532 (1985)); Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649-51 (1950) (noting
dubi ous constituti onality of efforts to punish extraterritorial violations); cf. Stat e Bd . of Ins. v.
Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451, 455 (1962) (Allgeyer principle incorporated into McCarranFerguson Act limited state regulation of insurance) . The Todd Shipyards conclusion is of
some relevance where a state seeks to interfere with the provision of medical insurance for
abortions.
82 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rel ations Law § 403 ( 1987) (eight factors determine "unreasonableness" which would bar application of law). Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 cmt. 5 ( 1987) takes the position that while states "generally exercise
jurisdiction on th e basis of territoriality," they "may apply at least some laws to a person
outside [state) territory on the basis that he is a citizen." It acknowledges, however, that such
cases "have generally involved acts or omissions that also had effect within the state." I d.
The Model Penal Code § 1.03( !)(a), approved in 1962, generally requires th at conduct
which is an "element of the offense" or a "result that is an element of th e offense" occur within
a state as a predicate for criminal liability. It also provides, howeve r, in § 1.03(l)(f), that
liability can be imposed if "the offense is based on a statute of this state that expressly prohibits
conduct outside the state when th e conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest
of this state." (emphasis added).
Th e Comments to this Section observe that "[S)o long as sovereignties are spatially defin ed, th eir reciprocal interests imply, at least in general, a limitation of their regulatory goals
to influencing what occurs within their borders." American Law Inst itute, Model Penal Code
Commentary § 1.03 cmt. 1, at 37-38. They state that the "reasonable relation to legitimate
interests" requirement "expresses the general principle of the fourte enth amendment limitation
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The last generation of Supreme Court cases has provided no substantial clarification. The Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of state criminal statutes aimed at regulating extraterritorial
behavior, although at least one Warren Court case implies thc.t extraterritorial criminal regulation is constitutionally dubious. 83 The only explicit guidance comes from civil cases, and that guidance is less than
cnsp.
In the civil context, the Court has held that neither the fu ll faith and
credit clause, nor the due process clause, requires a state " to substi tute
for its own [laws] , applicable to persons and events within it, the confli cting law of another state, " even if the other state is the residence of the
parties or the place in which the relationship began. 84 It has held as well
that mere residence is not talismanic: a home state "may not abrogate
the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to an ything
done or to be done wi thin them" simply on the basis of residence of one
of the parties. 8 5
Between these poles, a state's effort to apply its own law m ust be
based on "a significant contact ... creating state interests, such that
on state legislative jurisdiction" and "affords the courts the opportunity to reexamine antecedent extraterritorial regulation in light of a standard that takes due account of the problem of
federalism that is inescapably involved." I d. § 1.03 cmt. 6, at 55.
In discussing this section, Professor Wechsler observed that "[i]f the state wants to mak e
gambling criminal, for example, when the wager is to be placed in another state ... it may do
so far as that is constitutional." 1962 Proceedings of the American Law Institute 64.
The Comments to Tentative Draft No. 5 § 1.03 observed that "Control over citi zens is of
more significance in the relations between nations than it is in the relation between states of the
U nion . .
The question of constitutionality will have to be considered in relation to the
individual statute. " Id. at 12-13. In his comments at the 1956 Proceedings of the A meri can
Law Institute, Professor Wechsler stated that the tentative draft "does not legitimize anything," but "relies on the constitutional bar" to limit extraterritorial jurisdiction. i 956 Proceedings of the American Law Institute 97-99.
83 My colleague Steve Morse kindly pointed out to me that in Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 665-66 (1962), reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1965), the Court took as given the constraint that California could puni sh legitimately only for the actual use of narcotics "within the
state." In Robinson, although the evidence clearly demonstrated the recent use of narcoti cs,
the jury did not necessarily find use within California. The Court, therefore, treated the pun ishment as resting impermi ssibly on status, rather than conduct.
84 Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (quoting Pac. Employees Ins. Co.
v. Indus. Accident Comm ' n, 306 U. S. 493, 502 (1939)).
85 Id. at 820-22 (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930)); Allstate Ins. Co . v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-09, 311, 313 (1981) (stating in dicta that residence "standing alone"
is inadequate, and, citing Dick, stating that application of the law must be neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981). The residence at issue in Dick,
Shutts and Hague was that of the plaintiff, and the claim on behalf of choice of in-state law
was that harm to a state resident is a basis for regulating extraterritorial activities that produce
such harm. The cases do not directly address a claim based on residence of the defendant, nor
the theory that the state has a right to regulate the extraterritorial activities of its own citi zens
by virtue of their citizenship.
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choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 86 The
evaluation of "unfairness" may apparently be informed by "the tradition
in place when the constitutional provision was adopted [or by] subsequent practice. "8 7
Under this schema, the extent of Bigelow's continued vitality in the
face of the erosion of Roe will turn on the level of "significance" the
Court is willing to accord to the state "interest" offered as justification
for the efforts to prevent or punish extraterritorial abortions. The interests must be such that the application of home-state law is "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." If past arguments are any guide, the
Court will be required to evaluate two such "interests": the interest of
the home state in preventing state residents from engaging in activities
the state deems immoral, and the interest of the home state in protecting
the well-being of the fetus.
If the interest the Court recognizes in regulating abortion is primarily the interest in preventing the woman from engaging in what is regarded by her home state as an immoral act, then the "unfairness" of
punishing an act approved by the jurisdiction in which it occurs might
well raise sufficient due process concerns to invalidate prosecutorial efforts. 88 The O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter bloc in Casey viewed the state's
Shutls, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13).
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (19 88); cf. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495
U.S. 604, 611 (1990) ("[J]udging by the evidence of contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous decision s, one must conclude that [Justice] Story 's understanding was shared by Am erican
courts at the crucial time for present purposes: 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted .").
88 Cf. Hagu e, 449 U.S. at 334 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by R ehnquist, J.) ("The State
has a legitimate interest in applyi ng a rule of decision to the litigation on ly if the facts to which
the rule will be applied have created effects within the State, toward which the State's public
policy is directed."); see also note 95 infra (discussing Nielsen).
Precedents involving taxation cast doubt on the claim that a state may regulate all extraterritorial activi ties of a person domiciled within the state. In the tax area, due process requires both a "minimum connection between a state and the person, property or transaction it
seeks to tax" and a "relation to the benefits obtained" from the taxing state. Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992); see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of
T axa tion, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992); ASARCO Inc. v. Ida ho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S.
307,316 (1982); Ex xo n Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of R evenue, 447 U.S. 207,219-20 (1980);
Mobil Oil v. Comm ' r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 , 436-37 (1980).
With respect to corporations, "there must be a connection to the activity itself, rather
than a connection only to the actor the State seeks to tax." Allied-Signal, 112 S. Ct. at 2258;
see also ASARCO In c., 458 U.S. a t 346 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (under due process clause,
"a domiciliary State [like a nondomiciliary State] may tax investment income only if it confers
benefits on or affords protection to the investment ac tivity "). It is precisely the relation to the
activity of obtaining an abortion that is lacking in German-style prosecutions.
A state may tax a natural person's income from out-of-state activities on the theory that a
natural person owes a reasonab le degree of support to the state she inh abits in exchange for the
protection that makes th e receipt of income possible. See New York ex rei. Cohn v. Graves,
300 U.S. 308, 3 13 (1937); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 28 6 U.S. 276, 281 (1932); Seth
86

87
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interest as one of providing a "structural mechanism by which the State
or the parent or guardian of a minor may express profound respect for
the life of the unborn." 89 The adverse impact on home state expression
of respect for the unborn does not warrant the state control of conduct in
other states which have different priorities. 90 In a nation which guarantees the right to travel among states and proclaims a national citizenship
"entitling" visitors to take advantage of the "privileges and immunities"
enjoyed by local residents, such efforts to export moral jurisdiction are
dubious in the extreme. 91
The "significance" of the state's second possible interest, fetal protection, will turn in the first instance upon whether the Court is willing to
regard a fetus as a protected "person" in the teeth of the situs state's
determination that fetuses are unprotected. This is precisely the morass
Goldstein, Note, "Resident" Taxpayers: Internal Consistency, Due Process and State Income
Taxation, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 119, 129 ( 199 1). The obligation to pay a fair share of the costs of
government, however, does not speak to an obligation to obey state policy beyond state borders. The tax on income is an assessment based on what the state regards as the ability to pay,
an ability related to the ultimate receipt of income within the jurisdiction, see Graves, 300 U.S.
at 312-13, and does not reflect an effort to control the extraterritorial actions of the resident.
The wealt h of domestic corporations is not localized in the same fashion as is the wealth of
natural persons, but rather consists in a network of interactions. As a result, under the due
process clause, the state may tax only income proportional to those interactions which take
place within the district. With respect to the actions of natural persons, a similar concept
suggests that the state may only tax or control activities that take place within the taxing
jurisdiction.
Thus, although a state may impose an income tax on its residents' extraterritorial income
on the theory that the increment to the wealth of the resident ultimately takes place within the
jurisdiction, it cannot impose extraterritorial excise, inheritance, or use taxes, which attach to
particular extraterritorial activities or tangible property. Cf. American Oil Co. v. Neill , 380
U.S. 451 (1965) (excise tax); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (use tax);
Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 ( 1949) (inheritance tax on tangible property); Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (I 925) (inheritance tax on tangible property). States must impose
use taxes on property used within the jurisdiction because they are barred from collecting sales
taxes on extraterritorial purchases by their residents. See National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U .S. 551 , 555 (1977) (noting state practice of limiting use taxes
to consumption within state so as to avoid problems of due process that might arise from the
extension of the sales tax to interstate commerce); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577,
586 (1937) (holding that tax on use within state not vulnerable to constitutional objections to
tax on foreign sale). Extraterritorial regulation is more like an excise or sales tax than an
income tax.
89 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 11 2 S. Ct. at 2791 , 2820. Elsewhere the opinion refers to
an "important and legitimate interest in potential life," id. at 2817, and to an "interest ... in
promoting prenatal life." I d. at 2818.
90 At one extreme, the point seems clear. Abortions performed for California residents in
California may have an "effect" of providing role models that undercut the morality or "concern for the life of the unborn" which Utah wishes to promote. This effect, however, does not
give Utah a uthority to prosecute California residents for feticide, even if they subsequently
enter Utah. If the woman in question is a Utah resident, the effect of her extraterritorial
conduct on the moral climate of Utah seems no different.
91 See Part liB infra.
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of value choice from which Justice Scalia's rejection of Roe, joined in
Casey by three other Justices, has sought to extricate the Court, on the
theory that the Constitution has nothing to say about abortion rights. 92
If nothing else, the mobility of American citizens and the moral pluralism facilitated by American federalism suggest that no such line of retreat is available. The state-by-state moral dissensus surrounding
abortion will confront the Court with different voices in which "the people" of different states have spoken. In passing on state efforts at extraterritorial interdiction in the wake of the continuing erosion of Roe, the
Court will be forced to confront squarely the moral status of the fetus. 93
If the Court defers to the state of origin in viewing the fetus as not
simply a "potential" but an "actual" person, the "home" state might
have an interest in fetal well-being sufficient to extend its prescriptive
jurisdiction to the conduct of its citizens in other states. 94 Characteriza92 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (abortion unprotected because "the
Constitution says absolutely nothing about it," and "longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed"); id. at 2884-85 (accusing majority of using a
"process of constitutional adjudication that consists primarily of making value judgments,"
and lamenting "if we can ignore a long and clear tradition clarifying an ambiguous text ... the
people know that their value judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law schoolmaybe better.") (emphasis in original); see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (right to abortion cannot "be logically deduced
from the text of the Constitution-not, that is, without volunteering a judicial answer to the
nonjusticable question of when human life begins. Leaving this matter to the political process
is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically so."); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926,
2960-61 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("One will search in vain the document we are supposed
to be construing for text that provides the basis for argument over [abortion rights ... or in
our society's tradition for] any indication how a constitutional argument about them ought to
be resolved. The random and unpredictable results of our consequently unchanneled individual views make it increasingly evident, Term after Term, that the tools for this job are not to be
found in the lawyer's- and hence not in the judge's-workbox."); Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793-94 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
("[T]he fact that many men and women of good will and high commitment to constitutional
government place themselves on both sides of the abortion controversy strengthens my own
conviction that the values animating the Constitution do not compel recognition of the abortion liberty as fundamental."); id. at 796-97 (White, J., dissenting) ("Abortion is a hotly contested moral and political issue. Such issues, in our society, are to be resolved by the will of the
people .... I would return the issue to the people by overruling Roe v. Wade.").
93 Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2854 n.12 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (accusing Justice Scalia of
being "uncharacteristically naive" in assuming that overruling Roe would take the Court out
of the arena of abortion, arguing that "[s]tate efforts to regulate in a post-Roe world" would
raise issue of the "effect .. . differences among States in their approaches to abortion [would]
have on a woman's right to engage in interstate travel").
94 Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 (1981) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (state
interests in "safety and well-being" of residents and work force justify application of local law
to out-of-state insurer). Such an approach might raise what are now law school hypotheticals
to a form of high-stakes scholasticism. Can Utah claim that a fetus conceived in Utah by two
visiting Californians is a Utah citizen? What if the male is a resident of California and the
female from Utah or vice versa? Does prosecution require proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the citizenship of the father and the locus of conception? The fact that the fourteenth amend-
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tions with less moral force would have correspondingly lower levels of
"significance" in justifying extraterritorial regulation. Furthermore, in
terms of "fairness," there is a difference between seeking to deter acts
that both states agree are evil and seeking to punish an action that is
regarded as protected by the constitution of the state in which it occurs. 95
Such constitutional suspicions are amplified if "history" or "tradition" is relevant. 96 At the time of the framing of the fourteenth amendment, it was clear and settled law that the structure of the Union did not
permit states to punish extraterritorial conduct that was not intended to
produce tangible in-state effects. Citizens could be punished by the law
of the state where the act occurred, but they also had the right to rely on
that law if it gave them permission to engage in the act. Until the 1930s,
the Court clearly continued this principle in both civil and criminal cases
under the rubric of substantive due process. And while such limitations
have not applied to federal prosecution since the 1930s, no Supreme
Court case has upheld an extraterritorial state prosecution for conduct
occurring entirely in another state.
It could be argued that giving weight to this history would make an
anachronistic hash of modern conflict of laws approaches. These approaches allow states to apply their own law to issues arising from occurment defines "citizenship" in terms of persons "born" in the United States might well suggest
that the Court should decline to recognize assertions of the "citizenship" of fetuses by states
seeking to protect them.
95 In Neilsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315,320 (1909), the Court dismissed an Oregon prosecution of a Washington resident for fishing, in violation of an Oregon statute, in a portion of the
Columbia river subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of Oregon and Washington. The Neilsen
Court said "( w]here an act is malum in se, prohibited and punishable by the Jaw of both States,
the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute .... Doubtless the same rule
would apply if the act were (malum prohibitum] prohibited by each State separately." ld.
But where "the opinion of the legislatures of the two States is different ... the one State cannot
enforce its opinion against that of the other at least as to an act done within the limits of that
other State." I d. at 321.
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), is the only modern case in which the Court addressed Neilsen and the question of conflicting state sovereignties in the criminal context. The
Court upheld Alabama's efforts to punish a kidnap-murder which began in Alabama but ended
in Georgia. Although Justice O'Connor recognized Alabama's "interest in vindicating its sovereign authority through enforcement of its (criminal] Jaws," id. at 93, that interest arose by
virtue of the crime's Alabama origin rather than by virtue of the defendant's Alabama citizenship. Id. at 92-93. Indeed, the defense would apparently have succeeded had the jury accepted
its argument that the kidnapping did not begin in Alabama.
96 Justice Scalia's insistence on the importance of a "specific relevant tradition protecting
or denying protection to, the asserted right" in his dissent in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874, (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989)), is mirrored by a series of other
opinions relying on historical practice in construing the demands of due process. See note 59
supra; see also Casey, I 12 S. Ct. at 2859-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "historical
traditions of the American people" do not support classifying abortion as a fundamental right);
Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572,2577 (1992) (holding that historical practice is probative
of whether criminal rule of procedure regarding burden of proof is constitutionally mandated).
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rences outside of their borders on the basis of an appropriate state
"interest," even where traditional "lex locus delicti" principles would
dictate application of the law of the situs of the injury. T he proposition
that a state's relationship with its own citizens often serves as an adequate interest to allow it to apply its own law occurs frequen tly in modern confl icts discussions. The tacit acceptance by the Supreme Court of
"interest analysis," one might say, effectively dispenses with the claims of
history. 97 Thus, several conflicts scholars to whom I have shown this
Article have adduced a series of leading cases in which home states have
applied their own law to accidents involving their residents which occur
in foreign territory. 98
I am not a conflicts scholar. Still, to the untrained eye, the historical
concern for allowing states to determine their own moral climate seems
in fact to be incorporated into much of modern judicial conflicts methodology. The cases applying home law to extraterritorial occurrences usua lly do not involve the issue of moral dissensus which is at th e heart of
the abortion debate; instead, they involve issues regarding loss distribution from actions which both of the conflicting states regard as impermissible. Most cases adopting any of the "modern" conflicts methods
acknowledge the power of the law of the place where primary conduct
occurs to determine its basic permissibility or wrongfulness. 99
97 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 314-15 nn.19-20 (Brennan, J., for four Justices) ("Numerous
cases have applied the law of a jurisdiction other than the situs of the injury where there exists
some other link between that jurisdiction and the occurrence . . . . T he injury or death of a
resident of State A in State B is a contact of State A with the occurrence in State B."). The
Court in Hague held that neither the due process clause nor the full faith and credit clause
barred Minnesota from applying its own rules regarding stacking of automobile insurance policies to a claim regarding a Wisconsin accident under policies issued in Wisconsin to a Wisconsin resident. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion relied on the facts that the driver insured
under the policy commuted to Minnesota, that the beneficiary had later taken up residence in
Minnesota, and that the insurance company was registered to do business in Minnesota. Id. at
313-20.
Hague is obviously not a decision that gives great weight to the territory in which the
operative acts occurred. However, a decision regarding the legal effects of a contract made in
another state is different from an effort to apply controversial moral norms to forbid conduct
permitted in the state where it occurs. See text accompanying notes 100-05 infra (discussing
"conduct regulating rules"). Justice Stevens' concurrence in Hague relied on the failure of the
insurance company to establish "any direct or indirect threat to Wisconsin's sovereignty." Id.
at 325.
98 Frequently mentioned cases include: Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 722-26
(Cal.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976) (applying California dramshop statute to tavern owners who served California resident in Nevada); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967)
(refusing to apply Missouri damage limitation to accident occurring in Missouri); Tooker v.
Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 398-400 (N.Y. 1969) (refusing to apply Michigan guest statute to auto
accident occurring in Michigan); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963)
(refusing to apply Ontario guest statute to accident occurring in Ontario).
99 There are, of course, exceptions. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Labree v. Major,
306 A.2d 808, 817 (1973), in the course of refusing to apply what it regarded as a moribund
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Babcock v. Jackson 100 is the leading case rejecting "lex locus
delicti, " in favor of an " interest analysis." A lthough the N ew York
Court of A ppeals used an " interest analysis" approach in reaching a decision not to apply the guest statute of Ontario in adjudicating an action
between two New York residents regarding an accident in Ontario, the
court emphasized that the issue was one of loss distribution, rather than
primary conduct:
\V here the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in which th e allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive
concern . In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the law of the place
of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in regulating
conduct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek
the ap plicable rule of law in some other place. 10 1

Likewise, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently adopted the approach embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts over the " lex
locus delicti" approach, and, accordingly, applied Connecticut law to determine compensation for an auto accident between two Connecticut residents in Quebec. The court noted, however, that
Quebec, as the place of injury, has an obvious interest in applying its
standards of conduct to govern the liability, both civil and criminal, of
persons who use its highways . . . . If the issue at stake in the present
controversy were whether the defendant's conduct was negligent, we
might well conclude that Quebec's interest in applying its law was of
paramount significance. 102

Finally, in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 103 a "comparative impairment" approach to conflict of laws was used by the court to apply California law concerning dramshop liability to a sale of liquor that took
place in N evada. The California Supreme Court relied on the fact that
" [a]lthough the State of Nevada does not impose such civil liability on its
tavern keepers, nevertheless they are subject to criminal penalties under
a statute making it unlawful to sell or give intoxicating liquor to any
Massac husetts rule requiring "gross negligence" for recovery by a guest against a driver for an
accident in Massachusetts, took the posi tion that Rhode Island's " interest in imposing upon its
drivers a duty of ordinary care towards their passengers transcends consideration of the gues t's
res idence and of the state in which the ve hicle is operated. "
!GO 19 1 N .E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) .
101 Id . at 284. Babcock was later quoted with approval by Tooker, 249 N.E. 2d at 396 ("We
we re careful to distinguish the interest of Ontario in this case from what it would have been,
had the issue related to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his car at the time
of the accident."), and Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985)
(" [W)hen the conflicting rules involve the appropriate standa rds of conduct ... the law of the
place of the tort 'will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern.' ").
102 O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 23 (Conn. 19 86).
103 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
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person who is drunk." 104 It seems that it would do no great damage to
the structure of modern conflicts law to take these courts at their words;
the widespread rejection of strict territoriality is not equivalent to an
open invitation to apply controversial regulations to extraterritorial conduct in cases of moral dissensus. 105
The sixth amendment further exacerbates doubts regardi ng the constitutionality of criminal prosecutions for extraterritorial abortions.
Adopted in part in recollection of George III's threats to transport the
American colonists to England for the prosecution of acts committed in
Massachusetts, the amendment guarantees "an impartial jury of t he state
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." An abortion
" committed" in the state of California could not, if the sixth amendment
applies, be prosecuted before a jury of the state of Utah. 106
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue
of whether this vicinage requirement of the sixth amendment applies to
104 Id. at 725. This was in accord with Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in Reich v. Purcell,
432 P.2d 727 , 728-31 (Cal. 1967). In th e course of refusing to apply a Missouri damage limitation to an automobile collision which occurred in Missouri, Chief Justice Traynor observed :
"M issouri is concern ed with conduct within her borders and as to such conduct she has the
predominant interest of th e states in volved. Limitations of damages for wrongful death , however, have li tt le or nothing to do with conduct. They are concerned not with how people
should behave, but with how survivors should be compensated." Id. at 730-31. It is also
worth noting that the accident in Harrah 's occurred within California, and the co urt relied on
California's interest to "prevent tavern keepers from selling alcoholic beverages to obviously
intoxicated persons who are likel y to act in California in the intoxicated state." Id. at 725.
105 One founder of modern confl icts law, Walter Wheeler Cook, seemed to assert that "only
a blind foll owing of unsound territorial notions would lead to the conclusion" that any effort
by a state to apply its criminal law extraterritorially is necessarily unconstitutional. Walter
Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 16 ( 1949). The ch arge
that my con tentions are inconsistent with Cook's, however, should not troubl e us undul y.
Brainerd Currie, scarcely a dyed-in-the-wool territorialist, viewed it as " into lerable" for Georgia to invalidate a contract entered into on Sunday in Kansas by two Georgia residents.
The Georgia Court would hardly have taken the position that the parties in entering into
this transac tion in Kansas had committed an offense against the criminal laws of Georgia. This is true even tho ugh it happens that both parties were G eo rgia residents at the
time. The court gave that circumstance no weight, and would doubtl ess ha ve fou nd
un congen ial the "cosmopolitan principle" whereby a state may punish its citizens ....
for acts abroad which if committed within the state would be punishable.
B. Currie, supra note 70, at 59-60 (1963). For more modern commentary, see, e.g. , Korn,
supra note 69, at 805 (" When conduct and injury do occur at the same place, there h as never
been any question und er either the traditional or modern learnin g th at th e lex loci delicti
should be applied to resolve conflicts involving the so-called "conduct reg ulating" rul es of to rt
law.") .
106 This leaves aside the limitations that may be imposed by state constitutions. Professor
B.J. George, Jr., in Extraterrit orial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 M ich. L. Rev. 609,
630, 635-36 ( 1966), suggested, without much analysis, that states may prosecute their citizens
for extraterritorial conduct without violating federal due process constraints. He nonetheless
notes that state constitutional vicinage requirements are an obstacle to nat iona lity jurisdiction
in 29 states, albeit an obstacle that "preserv[es] in constitutional amber the rote thinking" of a
bygone era.

I
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the states by virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 107 dicta in two ·warren and Burger Court cases strongly support
incorporation. 108 Further, while there is controversy regarding the manner in which the sixth amendment's requirement of a "jury of the district" applies to state prosecutions, a solid line of recent state cases
supports the proposition that sixth amendment principles stand in the
way of state prosecutions of acts committed entirely in another state. 109
107 Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Alaba ma, 128 U.S. 96, 101 (1888),
holds that the art icle III requirement that crimes be prosecuted where they are committed is
inapplicable to the states, but makes no mention of the sixth amendment. Since the application
of the sixth amendment to the states through the fourt eenth amendment lay eighty years in the
future, see Duncan v. Lou isian a, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the failure to address the sixth amendment is hardly either surprising or dispositive. In addition, Nashville involved an Alabama
prosecution of an out-of-state company for employing a conductor to operate a train within
Alabama in violation of state licensing laws. Nashville, 128 U.S. at 97-98.
Likewise, Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77-79 ( 194 1), which approved a Florida prosecution for sponge divin g in international waters outside of Florida, was decided a generation
before the incorporation of the sixth amendment. Compare Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S.
81, 85 ( 1928) (holding that sixth amendment does not apply to state criminal prosecutions);
Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 326-27 (1868) (same).
108 In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92, 94-98 (1 970), the Court held that a 12-member
jury was not constitutio;J.ally required, emphasizing that the contrast between the common law
tradition of twelve jurors and the explicit constitutional protection of the vicinage requirement
shows that "where Congress wanted to leave no doubt that it was incorporating existing common-law features of the jury system, it knew how to use express language to that effect."
Williams' emphasis on the jury as a vehicle for "community participation," id. at 100, and the
need for a size sufficient to allow a "fair possibility of obtaining a representative cross section
of the community," id. , requires a definition of which "community" is to be represented. In
light of the vicinage req uirement, the relevant community would seem to be the community
where the crime occurred.
Likewise, Duncan v. Louisiana, in tracing the lineage of the jury trial right as applied to
the states, recounted the American colonial subjects' outrage at being deprived of the "inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152.
109 See, e.g. , People v. Jones, 510 P.2d 705, 709-10 (Cal. 1973) (sixth amendment vicinage
provisions apply to California state courts to require jury from judicial district where crime
occurred), modified by Hernandez v. Mun. Court, 781 P.2d 547, 549 (Cal. 1989) ("[W]e hold
that vicinage is defined as the county in which the crime was committed"); Patterson v.
Balkcom, 266 S.E.2d 179, 180-81 (Ga. 1980) (sixth amendment requires jury drawn from vicinage within Georgia); Mareska v. State, 534 N .E.2d 246, 248-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (use of
city-drawn jury to try offense in county violates sixth amendment vicinage standards); Hayes
v. Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky. 1985) (applying sixth amendment to forbid
state's prosecution of out-of-state theft); State v. Smith, 421 N. W.2d 315, 318, 321 (Minn.
1988) (finding that sixth amendment embodies territorial jurisdiction principle and refusin g
jurisdiction over murder where none of the elements were alleged to have occurred in Minnesota); cf. Mississippi Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Miss. 1987) (vicinage requirement of sixth amendment applies agai;J.st states); State v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274,
287-88 (Ohio 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 ( 1989) (applying sixth amendment, but concluding that Ohio trial for murder in which death occurred in Indiana does not violate sixth
amendment because sufficient elements of crime occurred in Ohio); State v. Harrington, 260
A.2d 692, 698 (Vt. 1969) (sixth amendment applies to interstate jurisdiction and requires that
an element of the crime be committed in state to support jurisdiction); see also Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003, 1007 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Davis v. O'Leary, 493 U.S. 920
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The reaffirmation last Term of governmental authority to abduct
criminal defendants forcibly from foreign countries and other states 110
provides a final reason for caution regarding extraterritorial state criminal jurisdiction. Given the exigencies of the international arena, we may
be willing to allow the federal government to extend its authority to actions in foreign countries by hook or by crook. We may countenance
occasional abductions from overseas of those who violate U .S. laws and
rely on diplomatic processes to compensate for excesses. But >vithin a
federal republic characterized by moral pluralism, a similar result between states should be unacceptable. An approach that would permit
prosecution for extraterritorial acts legal in the state of comm ission
would, under current doctrine, justify forcible abduction as well. The
image of state agents or private parties seeking to carry doctors or
women across state borders to be tried for feticide has too chilling a resemblance to our memory of ante-bellum slave catchers to be within the
range of constitutional permissibility.
The same objections, however, do not apply as forcefu lly to efforts
to prohibit women who seek abortions from leaving their home state of
the sort attempted by Irish authorities. 111 Because such efforts address
conduct initially within a state's own boundaries, they do not run afoul
of the constraints on extraterritoriality. Nonetheless, efforts by states to
deny a United States citizen the right to travel in order to take advantage
of opportunities available in neighboring states face overwhelming objections rooted in the nature of "our federalism, " objections which also
strengthen the case against attempts at extraterritorial criminal prosecu(1989) (applying sixth amendment vicinage clause to determine whether a venire-area was
sufficiently large; noting that "the 'district and state' language of the sixth amendment places
some parameters on a [state]legislature's power to draw the jurors but does not per se prevent
a legislature from delineating a smaller area from which to draw a jury").
Only one court has refused to apply the sixth amendment's requirement regarding "state
of offense" juries to state prosecutions in recent years. People v. Caruso, 51 9 N.E.2d 440, 446
(Ill. 19 87), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988) (sixth amendment does not forbid Illin ois fr om
exercising jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime of child abduction because ame ndment pertains only to venue and not to jurisdiction); cf. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F. 2d 344, 345-46 (6th Cir.
1988) (sixth amendment "district of offense" requirement does not apply to K entucky state
courts); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 593, 595-96 (5th Cir. 1986) (sixth amendment "d istrict of
offense" requirement does not apply to Texas state courts); State v. Bowma n, 588 A .2d 72 8,
730 (Me. 199 1) (sixth amendment is inapplicable to any state for crime occurring within its
borders).
110 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 21 89 (1992), reaffirming authority of
F risbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Frisbie, the latest of a line of similar cases, upheld the
conviction in Michigan of a defendant who had been kidnapped in Chicago by M ichigan officers. Frisbie, 342 U .S. at 519-20. Frisbie, unlike Alvarez-Machain, involved a crime that had
been committed within the kidnapping jurisdiction.
111 See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.

I

LAW OF CHOICE AND CHOICE OF LAW

June 1992]

487

tion analogous to recent German efforts. 112
II
NATIONAL UNION AND NATIONAL C ITIZE NSHIP
IN "OUR FEDER ALIS M"

The decay of substantive due process limitations on legislative jurisdiction over citizens has left the federal government essentially without
territorial constraints on its power to legislate in regard to the behavior
of i\mericans abroad. Despite some loose language in the writings of
both courts and commentators, however, the power of states to legislate
the behavior of their citizens in other American states is distinct from the
Federal government' s power to legislate overseas. States, as members of
a federal union, are not free to treat other states as foreign countries. 11 3
By the explicit terms of our national compact, states are obliged to
give to one another's public acts "full faith and credit." 114 They must
extradite fugitives to neighboring states on demand, 115 and cannot resort
to war or diplomatic processes to resolve grievances among themselves.116 Under the fourteenth amendment states may not define their
own citizenship; they are obliged to accept as citizens any national citizen
who may seek to reside within their borders. 117 Visiting citizens from
sister states are entitled to the privileges and immunities of local citizens.11 8 The territories of the states are determined by national
mandate. 119
Whereas a national sovereign has plenary control over the passage
of goods and persons across its borders, explicit constitutional limits bar
states from taxin g imports or exports. 12° F urthermore, as the Court has
construed the mandates of national union and the commerce clause,
states are not permitted in any way to cut themselves off from the tides of
112 See note 23
11 3 A separate

and accompanying text supra.
reason for circumspection in applying international norms to interstate
problems is that in ternationa l la w recognition of jurisdiction over crimes committed by citizens
ab road is "justifie d on the ground that a State's treatment of its nation als is not ordinarily a
ma tter of concern to other states or to international law. " Draft Conven tion on Jurisdiction
with Respec t to Crime, 29 A m. J. In t'l Law 439 , 519 (Supp. 1935). Adopt ion of the fourteen th
amendment makes it difficult to maintain that the U.S. Constituti on is similarly indifferent to
the relations between a state and its citizens.
114 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
i 15 See U .S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
116 See U.S . Const. art. I, § 10.
117 See U.S. Const. amend. X IV, § 1.
118 See U .S. Const. art. IV,§ 2.
11 9 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 (return of fugitive slaves); art. III , § 2 (conflicting land
grants in original jurisdiction of Supreme Court).
120 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
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the national economy of which they and their neighbors are a part. 121 It
is no surprise, therefore, that, unlike the federal government in its relations with foreign nations, the states are constrained by the commerce
clause, article IV, and the principles of federalism in their dealings with
one another and m thei r ability to regulate their citizens
extraterritorially _1 22

A.

The Commerce Clause

For state citizens who seek more hospitable jurisdictions in which to
engage in morally-contested activities barred to them at home, the federal protection of interstate commerce offers shelter. Although the exact
parameters of the activities protected as "interstate commerce" have
changed over the years, the two methods by which states might endeavor
to prevent their citizens from obtaining out-of-state abortions are both
repugnant to the commerce clause.
First, states might seek to follow the Irish example and bar wo men
from departing for "immoral" purposes. American courts, from Gibbons
v. Ogden 123 forward, have found the interstate movement of persons to
be a form of interstate commerce that is protected against state obstruction.1 24 Thus, a leading case, Edwards v. California, 125 invalidated California's criminal prohibition on knowingly bringing indigent nonresidents into the state. The commerce clause barred such efforts:
It is difficult to conceive of a state statute more squarely in conflict
with [the theory of the commerce clause]. . .. Its express purpose and
inevitable effect is to prohibit the transportation of indigent persons
across the California border. The burden upon interstate commerce is
intended and immediate; it is the plain and sole function of the

121 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1942) (stating that of all limits on state ac tivity "none is more certai n than the prohibition against a ttempts on the part of any sin gle State
to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the transportation of
persons and propert y across its borders").
122 Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 69, at 28 (noting that neither commerce clause no r a rticle IV
limit asse rtion of federal extraterritorial jurisdiction). In this regard, the Restatement (Thi rd )
of Foreign Relations Law is in error when it states that "exercise of jurisdiction to presc ribe by
States is governed by the same principles whether the exercise of jurisdiction has international
or inter State impli cations." Restatemen t (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 cmt. 5
(1986).
123 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
124 See, e.g., Pickard v. PullmanS . Car Co ., 117 U.S. 34, 48 (1 886); Head Money Cases, 112
U. S. 580, 591-94 (1 884); Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1 875) ; cf. Chy Lung v. F reeman , 92 U.S. 275,2 80 (1875) (Californi a statute seekin g to exclude immoral immigran ts struck
down); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 42-43 (1867) (passenger trains consti tute
commerce, but not clear that dolla r per person exit tax constitutes impermissible burden);
Passenger Cases, 48 U .S. (7 How.) 283 (1850) (tax and inspection of passengers violates the
commerce clause).
125 314 u.s. 160 (1942).
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statute. 126

Statutes that directly forbid citizens from departing for "immoral" purposes would similarly constitute impermissible interferences with interstate commerce. 1 2 7
Second, a state might follow Germany's example and seek to puni sh
women who travel to more permissive locales only upon their return
home. As we will see, this tactic would also be of doubtful constitutional
validity under current commerce clause doctrine.
The offer of services by out-of-state providers and women's purchase
of them, insofar as women travel across state iines to make the purchases,
are both forms of interstate commerce. 12 8 Since the mid-nineteenth cenId. at 174.
Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (19 8 1), in uph olding an enhanced penalty agai nst a nonsupporting father who fled the state, suggests that a state co uld inhibi t the ex it of a person who
has already committed a crime within the state, a t least where "d eparture agg ravates th e consequences of conduct that is ot herwise punishable[,] " id. at 422, just as it could arrest her, or
have her remitted by extradition. But, by hypothesis, when a citize n departs from the state to
obtain an abo rtion , no crime has yet been commi tted (unless interstate travel is a criminal
offense) and the abortion itself will occ ur on the other side of the border.
Similarly, a number of quarantine cases which reject commerce clause challenges rest on
the power of the state to protect agai nst dangerous consequences within its own borders. See
R eid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 152-53 ( 1902) (upholding inspection of potentially infected
cattle); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186
U.S. 380, 396-97 (1902) (upholding excl usion of Ita lian immigrants from area decla red to be in
quarantine for infectious diseases); Railway Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1 878) (striking
down statute prohibiting importati on of Mexican cattle, but in dictum suggesting that "when
absolutely necessary for its self protection ," a state may "prevent persons and animals suffering
under contagious diseases o r convicts, &c, from entering the state" (and paupers and lewd
women as well)); see also text accompanying note 160 & accompanying text infra (discussing
"local" effects).
One colleague has suggested that a state could avoid a commerce clause attack by making
it a crime to travel over any road within the state for the purpose of obtaining an abortion , and
seek to punish the travel leading up to interstate movement rather than the movement itself.
In addressing a similar stratagem in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992), the Court recently observed, "our prior cases
teach that a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the
Commerce Clause by curtai ling the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of
the State, rather than through the State itself. " The principle, presumably, applies to the movement of people as well. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 195 (1 824) ("Can a
trading expedition between two adjoining sta tes commence and terminate outside of each? ...
[The commerce power] must be exercised within the jurisd iction of the several states.").
128 Professional services were not considered to be "commerce" for much of the nation's
history. See, e.g., Blumenstock Bros. Ad vertisin g Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S.
436, 442-44 (1920) (services of advertising agency not "commerce"). Today, however, a ci tizen seeking to patronize a foreign abortion clinic would be held to be engaged in interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Summit Health v. Pinhas, Ill S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1991) (opthamologic
surgery performed on out-of-state residents for pay is interstate commerce); United States v.
Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 337-39 (1952) (provision of medical services by doctorsponsored corporations constitutes interstate commerce). See generally United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944) ("Commerce," as referred to in
the commerce clause, refers to any trade or business in which people "bought and sold, bar126
12 7
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tury, the commerce clause has been held to be a barrier to state statutes
that seek to "obstruct" or regulate commerce in other states. 129 In an era
when due process was thought to limit a state's authority strictly to its
own territory, the doctrine could hardly have been otherwise. The states'
inherent "police power" might permit the burdening of interstate commerce under some circumstances, but if the state's authority stopped at
its borders, its "police power" could reach no further. When the morals
of one state conflicted with those of its neighbor, moralizing efforts to
interfere with commerce necessarily had to stop at the state boundary.
T his issue was fought out in the struggles over attem pts by states to impose P rohibition. 130 In reasserting the commerce clause as a barrier to
Imva's efforts to deny its citizens access to liquor from neighboring
states, for example, the Court characterized its prior limitations on interstate prohibition as resting upon "the obvious want of power of one State
to destroy contracts [by its citizens] concerning interstate commerce,
valid in the States where made." 131
gained and contracted," including the sale of fire insurance).
Likewise, while certain "deleterious or injurious" articles were held "to lose all benefit of
protection as articles or things of commerce," Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 60-61
(1891); see also Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 60 (1915) (rotten fruit), items which are the
subject of moral debate have always remained subjects of commerce. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 110 (1890) (alcohol); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 576-86 (1847)
(T aney, C.J.) (alcohol). See generally Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023, n.3 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978)) ("All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce
Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset.").
129 The first case to strike down a state law on commerce clause grounds was State Freight
Tax Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 281-82 (1872) (striking down Pennsylvania tax on railroads
operating through state on per-ton basis).
130 See Leisy, 135 U.S. at 159 (Gray, J. , dissenting) (Iowa liquor laws should be upheld
because "they are not aimed at interstate commerce .
but operate only on intoxicating
liquors within the territoria1limits of the state"); id. at 153 (police power to "secure the safety
of persons and property within their territorial limits" allows regulation of railroads); Bowman
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 479, 498-99 (1888) (striking down state prohibition on
importation of liquor because "[i]t is not an exercise of the jurisdiction of the State over person s and property within its limits ... it is an attempt to exert that jurisdiction over persons
and property within the limits of other states"); cf. Crossman v. Lurman 192 U .S. 189, 198-200
( 1904) (New York food and drug law could apply to shipment of coffee from Brazil to residents of Maryland without violating commerce clause because "the contract of sale was made
in New York, the storage and delivery in the City of New York was therein provided for").
131 A merican Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133, 143 (1904); see id. at 143-44 ("To sustain,
therefore, the ruling of the court below would require us to decide that the law of Iowa operated in another state so as to invalidate a lawful contract as to interstate commerce made in
such other state ... it would subject contracts made by common carriers and valid by the laws
of the State where made to the laws of another State.").
Similarly, in Shafer v. Farmer's Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 196, 199 (1925), the Court
reviewed a state statute that regulated in-state sales of grain with a goal of preventing "unreasonable margins of profit" on out-of-state resales, struck it down, and proclaimed that "a state
statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens commerce is a
prohibited regulation and invalid regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted." See
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Even though strict territoriality has fad ed in the due process area,
the Court has continued to regard efforts to regulate commerce in other
states as usurpations under the commerce clause. To some extent this is
analytically inevitable. From the point of view of the market participants, a situation in which Utah prohibits its residents from entering into
transactions in California is the same as the situation in which California
prohibits residents of Utah from competing in local California markets.
In either case, Utah citizens cannot do business in California. The commerce cl ause prohibition against "discriminatory" regulations by California barring Utah residents from local markets is clearly established.
Whether this clarity results from Court recognition of the adverse impact
of such quasi-tariffs on the national market, 132 or national unity, 13 3 the
commerce clause should also prevent Utah from erecting barriers with
similar effects. 134
Western Un ion Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914) (Ho lmes, J. , for a unanimous
Court) (state statute imposing tort liability for negligent delivery of telegram outside of state
territory violates commerce clause).
132 See American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) ("we have
steadfastly adhered to the central tenet that the Commerce Clause 'by its own force created an
area of trade free from interference by the States,'"); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,
539 ( 1949) ("Our system, fostered by the commerce clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every
market in the Nation . .. every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any."); cf. Dennis v. Higgins, IllS.
Ct. 86 5, 871-72 (1991) ("Commerce Clause ... confer[s] a 'right' to engage in interstate trade
free from restrictive state regulation ... 'intend[ed] to benefit'" those engaged in interstate
commerce, not only to promote national economic union).
133 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (comm erce clause "reflected a central concern among the Framers ... the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union
would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization"); Baldwin v. GAF Seelig,
294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) ("The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political
philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are
in union and not division.").
134 The legitimacy of import barriers and extraterritorial regulation differs if the negative
commerce clause focuses exclusively on protecting unrepresented outsiders, see, e.g., South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 ( 1938), and avoiding economic protectionism, see, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 122 S. Ct. 789, 800 ( 1991) (statutes
invalid when they "amount to simple economic protectionism"). Cf. Tyler Pipe Indus. Inc. v.
Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 258-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that protection should be limited to "rank discrimination against citizens of other states" );
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 ( 1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (only
discriminating statutes or those which impose risk of inconsistent regulation violate commerce
clause). Extraterritorial regulation of citizens does not raise the concern for state exploitation
of non-citizens.
An exclusive focus on protecting outsiders, however, is inconsistent with the proposition,
recently reaffirmed in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
11 2 S. Ct. 2019, 2025 (1992), that "a burden imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is
not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the
states, including the people of the State enacting such statute" (quoting Brimmer v. Rebman,
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T he modern touchstone is Baldwin v. GAF Seelig, 135 where New
York sought to condition intrastate milk sales on a New York milk distributor's payment of a minimum price for milk that it purchased in Vermont. The Court declared that under the commerce clause it was
undisputed that "New York has no power to project its legislation into
Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired
there," even when regulating a New York milk dealer. 136 The New York
prohibition sought to do exactly that: the statute's "avowed purpose"
was to affect the price of milk in Vermont, and, under the commerce
clause, "[o]ne state may not put pressure of that sort upon others to reform their economic standards." 137
Although commerce clause jurisprudence has evolved since Ba ldwin , the proposition that extraterritorial commercial interventions violate the clause has remained intact. 138 In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 13 9 the
Court struck down an Illinois statute that regulated take-over bids for
13 8 U.S. 78 (1891)). See also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (!951) (Wisconsin
statute protecting local dairy industry against out-of-state competition by imposing lim it th at
bore on both in-state and out-of-state marketers struck down as violation of commerce clause).
Nor is economic exploitation of other states the only evil at which the commerce cla use is
directed. If California had rested its desi re to exclude indigents in Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 ( 1942), exclusively on claims about "[t]he increase of rape and incest traceable to the
crowded conditions in which these people are forced to live" and the "petty crime among them
[which] has featured the criminal calendars of every community into which they have moved,"
id. at 168 (argument for appellees), the non-economic nature of the state purposes would not
make the prohibition of immigration any less an impermissible burden on commerce. Similarl y, if a public-spirited state wholly without self-interest forbade its residents from exporting
wastes in order to save the landfill capacities of its neighbors, the burden on commerce would
not be less for the lack of discrimination or desire to benefi t in-state merchants at the expense
of out-of-staters. Cf. Was te Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D. Minn.
1992) (emphasizing that purpose of regulation prohibiting export of wastes is not necessarily
dispositive on issue of regulation being impermissible burden on commerce); Stephen D . De
Vito Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rh ode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775 , 780
(D.R.I.) (same), aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
135 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
136 Id. at 521.
137 Id . at 522-24; cf. H ood & Sons v. DuMond , 336 U.S. 525, 556-57 (!949) (Black, J. ,
dissenting) ("It was because New Yo rk attempted to project its law into Vermont that even its
admitted health purpose was insufficient to o utweigh Vermont's interest in controlling its own
local affairs" ); id. at 570 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The nakedness of New York's purpose
to reach into Vermont was ill-concealed by the tenuous justification that if Vermont farmers
got cheap prices for their milk they would be tempted to save the expense of sanitary preca utions and thereby affect the health of New York consumers.") .
138 In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U .S. 269, 275 (198 8), Justice Scalia, who is usua lly
un enthusiastic about negative comm erce doctrine, cited Baldwin for a unanimous court as a
"leading case." See also Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024 (citing Baldwin as one example of
what was termed in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978), a "presumably
legitimate goal sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the
national economy").
139 457 u.s. 624 (1982).
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Illinois-affiliated corporations, no matter where the bids were initiated or
where the takeover was consummated. Justice White's plurality observed that while "not every exercise of state power with some impact on
interstate commerce is invalid," 140 "direct regulation is prohibited." 141
The Illinois Act "directly regulates transactions which take place across
state lines" and hence was held invalid. 142 The commerce clause "precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place
wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has
effects within the state." 14 3
In his opinion in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America , 144 Justice Powell appeared to limit MITE. He emphasized that the MITE opinion did
not represent the views of the full court and went on to interpret MITE's
commerce clause analysis as resting not on extraterritoriality but on the
possibility that the takeover statute would lead to inconsistent regulation
of interstate commerce, 14 5 as well as on Illinois's absence of interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations. 146 The
Indiana statute at issue in CTS, which structured the voting rules for
Indiana corporations with substantial blocs of Indiana shareholders, was
vulnerable on neither count. Indiana, the Court held, had established the
corporate charter it was seeking to regulate, and "[had] a substantial interest in preventing the corporate form from becoming a shield for unfair
business dealing." 147
CTS, however, was not the end of the matter. In Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 148 a majority of the Court relied on MITE for the proposition that " the 'Commerce Clause . .. precludes the application of a state
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.' " 149 The
Id. at 640.
Id.
142 Id. at 641 (joined by Burger, Stevens, & O'Connor, J .J .).
143 Id. at 642-43. The plurality went on to characterize the statute in the alternative as a
"burden on interstate commerce" whose effects where excessive in relation to Illinois' interests.
Id. at 643.
144 48 1 U.S. 69 (1987).
14 5 Id. at 88.
146 ld. at 93.
14 7 ld .
148 491 U.S. 324 ( 1989).
149 Id. at 536 (citing MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982)); see also id. at 536 n.13 (citing MITE)
("any attempt 'directly' to assert ex traterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property ..
exceed[s] the inherent limits of the State's power"); id. at 333 n. 9 (MITE "significantly illuminates the contours of the constitutional prohibition on extraterritorial legislation").
Arguably support for the reaffi rmation of the MITE principle was even broader, since
Justices Stevens and O'Connor, who joined in MITE , joined Justice R ehnquist's dissent in
Healy , which was based on the absence of "concrete evidence that the Connecticut regulation
will have any effect on the beer prices charged in other states." Id . at 347. In his concurrence
140
141
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Court invalidated Connecticut's efforts to link the price of beer that interstate brewers sold within Connecticut to the prices that those brewers
charged in neighboring states. The Court observed that the scheme "has
the undeniable effect of controlling commercial activity occurring wholly
outside the boundary of the State." 150 It thus violated the stricture that
"a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the
boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial
reach was in tended by the legislature. " 15 1
Most recently, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 152 a majority of the
Court reaffirmed the existence under the commerce clause of a "safe harbor for vendors 'whose only connection with customers in the [taxing]
State is by common carrier or the United States mail. ' " 1 53 The Quill
Court's proposition that the commerce clause mandates a " physical presin H ea ly , Just ice Scalia explicitly declined to join in th e MITE analysis, calling it "dubious and
unnecessary" since it rested on the " mere economic realit y" that th e brewers could be expected
to change their policies in neighboring states. Id. at 345. This position does not directly address the question of the status of an explicit effort to regulate out-of-state transactions.
ISO ld. at 33 7.
15 1 Id . at 336; see, e.g., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Sta te Corp. Comm'n , 489 U.S.
493, 523 (1989) (" We have applied a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity' ... when a state law
'directly regu lates or discriminates against interstate commerce.'") (cita tions omitted) ; K-S
Pharmacies, Inc. v. American H ome Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (''No state may require sellers to charge the same price within its borders as they
charge elsewhere. Such statutes, the Supreme Court has held , assert extraterritorial jurisdiction of a kind denied to the states by the 'negative' or 'dormant ' commerce clause.").
H ealy was prefigured both by the Court's summary affirmance of the invalidation of Connecticut's predecessor statute in United States Brewers Ass' n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 279 (2d
Cir. 1982), aff 'd, 464 U.S. 909 (1983) ("If the purpose or effect of a state's law is to regulate
conduct occu rring wh olly outside the state, the burden on commerce is generally held impermissible, and the fact that the law may not have been intended as protectionist o r discriminato ry will not save it. "), and by the invalidation of New York's price affirmation law in BrownForman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth. , 476 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1986) ("When a
state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce ... we have generally struck down the statute without furth er inquiry.
Our inquiry, then, must center on
whether New York's affirmation law regulates commerce in ot her states. " ). Cf. Wyomin g v.
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 n.12 (1992) (citing Brown-Forman with approval).
152 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
153 Id. at 19 14 (citing National Bellas H ess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U .S. 753 , 758
(1967), overruled by Quill) (with respect to due process clause)). The Court suggested that the
"physical presence" requirement had its root in aspects of the test enunciated in Complete
Au to Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) , " requir[in g] a substantial ne xus and a
relationship between the tax and State-provided services (which]limit the reach of State taxing
authority so as to ensure that State taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce."
Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1923.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas concurred onl y on grounds of stare decisis, declining to reach the merits of the " safe harbor" approach. See id. at 1923. Justice White dissented, characterizing a "physical presence" requirement as "anachronistic," in light of the
benefits that mail order sellers derive from the customer state' s court and commercial credit
systems. See id. at 1920.
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ence" prerequisite for jurisdiction-to-tax supports the parallel proposition that the clause embodies a "physical absence" limit on direct
extraterritorial regulation. If a state may not impose tax collection obligations on interstate vendors' transactions, even when one end of the
transaction is within the taxing state, because one party to the transaction is absent, then a state certainly may not tax a transaction occurring
entirely outside its borders. 154 A fortiori, it may not prohibit that
transaction.
Efforts to punish or regulate legal extraterritorial abortions seek to
control commercial activity in other states. They do not seek to prevent
the exercise of state-created intangible privileges as a "shield for unfair
business dealing" as in CTS, for the women whose futures are at issue do
not owe their existence to the state in which they reside . Attem pts to
regulate extraterritorial abortions do not attach consequences only tangentially to events occurring in other states, for they are intentionally
directed at wholly preventing transactions that are legal in the states
where they occur. 155 Such efforts would thus transgress commerce
clause limits even if the due process clause would permit the exertion of
" legislative jurisdiction." 156
This conclusion, however, is subject to two limitations. First, it is
154 Under the comm erce clause, domicile alone does not give a state aut hority to tax the
out-of-state transactions of the domiciliary . See, e.g., D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486
U.S. 24, 30 (1988) (use taxation of domiciliary corporation's activities must meet test articulated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977): "activity [must have]
a substantia l nexus with [the state), and the tax [must be] fairly apportioned, [must] not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [must be] fairly related to benefits provided by the
State"); id. at 32 ("fair apportionment" required that state "not attempt to tax that portion of
the catalogs that went to out-of-state customers"); see also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,
263 (1989) ("We believe that only two States have a nexus substantial enough to tax a consumer's purchase of an interstate telephone call": the state of the service address where the call
is billed, and the state of origination); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 314 ( 1938)
(gross receipts tax on Indiana domiciliary corporation's out-of-state sales violated commerce
clause); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. , 300 U.S. 577, 583 (1937) (use tax on domestic use of
product permitted although tax on extraterritorial purchase by state resident would not be).
Indeed, Complete Auto Transit, the case that enunciated the currently gove rning standard,
itself involved a domiciliary corporation . See Goldstein, supra note 88, at 136.
According to Quill, the "substantial nexus" and "relationship" requirements of Complete
A uta Transit "limit the reach of State taxing authority so as to ensure that State taxation does
not unduly burden interstate commerce," while the "fair apportionment" and "non-discrimination" elements prohibit imposing "an unfair share of the tax burden " on interstate commerce. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1913.
155 Cf. Healy v. Beer lnst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (discussing "direct regulation");
text accompanying notes 99-105 supra (discussing "conduct regulating" rules) .
156 Cf. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1913-14 (tax invalid under commerce clause for lack of physical
contact with seller, even though valid under due process as exhibiting requisite "nexus"); Tyler
Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U .S. 232,253 (1987) (multiple activities exemption of state tax invalid, even though due process "nexus" challenge to wholesale tax
rejected).
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well recognized that Congress may intervene to alter commerce clause
constraints. 157 A right to seek an out-of-state abortion premised ,on the
commerce clause is only as solidly rooted as the Congressional majority
or Presidential veto which prevents the imposition of limitations. In
some ways, however, this factor is an advantage of the commerce clause
theory. It allows the Court to constrain state imposition, while at the
same time permitting the Justices to disavow efforts to impose their own
constitutional vision upon the democratic process. If Congress can always override the Court's decisions, the Court can claim at least the
shadow of majoritarian legitimacy. The recent Quill case highlights the
Court's attraction to this aspect of the doctrine. The net effect of the
commerce clause theory is to put the ability to protect the rights of
women who can travel in the hands of any blocking coalition at the national level. Under this theory a national consensus is necessary before
any individual state can attempt the tactics tried by Ireland or Germany.
The hypothesis upon which this Article has proceeded is that such a consensus is unlikely to develop.
Second, although it has been said that "direct regulations" of interstate commerce are subject to a rule of virtual "per se invalidity," and
extraterritorial limitations "exceed the limitations of the enacting state's
authority," all of the cases in which statutes have been invalidated have
involved laws which in some sense could be characterized as economic
protectionism or predation. Commerce clause doctrine is scarcely a taut
and unchanging framework; it might be soft enough to allow the Court
to invoke the proposition that while exclusionary regulations are subject
to "strict scrutiny," such regulations may be acceptable if they are "demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism."158 Such a modification would, like the due process theories
canvassed earlier, directly confront the Court with the question of what
weight to give the state's interest in fetal protection as against the inter157 See, e.g., Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912, 1916 (describing four-prong test Court uses to sustain
tax against commerce clause challenge and deferring to Congress's "ultimate power to resolve"
the matter); Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 523-24
(1989) (citing Congress' power to identify state action that does not violate commerce clause,
despite its effect on interstate commerce).
158 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (Maine statute prohibiting importation of live baitfish upheld to prevent environmental risks to wildlife population), cited in
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992), and New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 274 (1988); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992) (quoting New Energy); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2015 (1992) (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rei. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (striking down Nebraska statute banning transport of
water without a permit for use in adjoining state, noting that "[f]or Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one hand,
and health and safety regulation , on the other").
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ests of national economic union and unimpeded interstate commerce.
The modern cases which have successfully invoked this justification
for burdening interstate commerce, however, have involved efforts to
protect against in-state health and welfare dangers. 159 Indeed, the kinds
of justifications which might meet the test often have been described as
"local" ones, in keeping with the earlier definitions of police power. 160
To the extent that states seek to interfere with abortions which occur in
other states, it is difficult to characterize the effects they seek to avoid as
"local" ones.
This conclusion is strengthened by considering the privileges and
immunities clause, the constitutional provision which the Court has described as having a "mutually reinforcing relationship" with the goals of
union embedded in the commerce clause doctrine. 161

B.

Privileges, Immunities, and National Citizenship

One of the concerns reflected in the commerce clause is a concern
with preserving the opportunities of citizens in a federal system composed of states with competing public agendas. The text of the clause,
however, seems an unlikely vehicle with which to regulate interstate contests of morality. There is, however, a constitutional provision whose
words more directly address the issue of what it means to be a citizen of a
federal republic afflicted or blessed with moral dissensus. Article IV's
privileges and immunities clause provides that "[t]he citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." 162
The text's apparent meaning is that when American citizens travel
outside of the territory of their home state-and thus "in the several
states"-they are "entitled" to partake of the "privileges and immunities" of local citizens. In cases of moral dissensus, all American citizens
present in a state are equally entitled to the privileges and immunities of
the local climate.
159 See Maine, 477 U.S. at 140-41 (protection of Maine's fisheries); Sporhase, 458 U.S. at
954-55 (conservation of diminishing ground water sources). Note that Sporhase struck down a
reciprocity requirement that sought to obtain comparable water from another state. Sporhase,
458 U.S. at 960.
160 See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that dormant
commerce clause should not apply to "law[s] directed to legitimate local concerns"); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (applying "strictest scrutiny [to] any purported legitimate
local purpose"), quoted in Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2014; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (state must be able "to justify
[statute] both in terms of the local benefits flowing from statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives"), quoted in Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2014.
161 Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978).
162 U.S. Const. art. IV,§ 2, cl.l.
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Constraints on Inhospitable Hosts

At its most uncontroversial, the privileges and immunities clause
constrains discrimination against out-of-state citizens. The "privileges
and immunities" granted to residents cannot be denied to out-of-state
citizens. Beginning with Ward v. Maryland , 163 in which the Court determined that Maryland could not tax foreign traders at a higher rate than
it imposed on domestic traders, and culminating most recently in a trio
of cases in which the Court invalidated states' refusals to allow local
practice by out-of-state attorneys, 164 the Court has regularly interpreted
the clause to place constitutional barriers in the path of states' efforts to
deny citizens of other states rights or privileges granted to their own residents.165 Thus, even if Roe is overruled and abortion becomes merely
another regulated medical procedure, Doe v. Bolton's conclusion that the
privileges and immunities clause prevents a state in which abortion servJces are available from denying access to non-residents 166 seems well
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430-32 (1871).
See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 559 (1989); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 70 (1988); Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288
(1985).
165 The barriers are not absolute. The most recent Supreme Court articulation of the test is
found in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. at 552 ("When a challenged restriction deprives
nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless '(i) there is
a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced
against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's objective' in light of less
restrictive means available to accomplish the objective.").
In Piper, Justice Rehnquist voiced dissent from the "least restrictive means" branch of the
analysis. See Piper, 4 70 U.S. at 294-95. His dissent in Friedman "on the same basis as Piper"
was joined only by Justice Scalia, who did not join the Rehnquist dissent in Barnard. See
Friedman, 487 U.S. at 71. The dissent in Barnard, joined by Justices White and O'Connor,
was based on the "unique circumstances of legal practice in the Virgin Islands." See Barnard,
489 U.S. at 560. Justice Rehnquist's own articulation seems to be found in United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 ( 1984) (the clause "does not preclude
discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a 'substantial reason' for the difference in treatment ... (and) the degree of discrimination bears a close relationship to (the
reason].")
Thus, in dealing with the problem of extraterritorial regulation of abortion, the members
of the Court who seek to avoid taking a position on abortion by treating it as a question
entirely for the legislature will be thrown back by doctrine to the task of determining whether
the effort to prevent extraterritorial abortions is a "substantial" interest. In this regard, the
holding in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 668 (1975), that under the privileges and
immunities clause "the constitutionality of one State's statutes affecting nonresidents [cannot]
depend upon the present configuration of the statutes of another State," suggests that a simple
desire to honor the home state's anti-abortion policy would not justify prohibiting out-of-state
residents obtaining abortions on a basis of equality with dom estic residents. See also Travis v.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 82 (1920) ("A State may not barter away the right,
conferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of the United States, to enjoy the privileges and
immunities of citizens when they go into other States."), quoted with approval in Austin, 420
U.S. at 667.
166 410 u.s. 179, 200 (1973).
163
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grounded. The opportunity to obtain an abortion is no less a "privilege
and immunity" than the opportunity to practice law or to fish for
shrimp. 167 Article IV's long-standing obligation to " place the citizens of
each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States" 16 8 will
constrain efforts to bar inhabitants of other states from the abortion opportunities permitted to locals. 169
167 This seems particu larly to be the case in states which regard abortion as a right protected under their own constitutions. It would be difficult to argue that a state const itutional
right is not a "privilege or immunity'' of state citizenship. The exclusions from the definition
o f "privi lege and immunity" which the Co urt has explicitly recognized in recent years have
included: ( I) an exception for activities that are not "basic and essential" in Baldwin v. Montana F ish & Game Comm'n , 436 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1978) (elk hunting license); (2) an exception dictated by the structu re of fed eralism for the ri ght to vote and ho ld political office, in
Piper, 470 U.S . at 282 n.l3 (right to vote and to hold political office); and (3) an exception for
goods and services created by the state itsel f, in Martinez v. Bynum , 46 1 U.S. 321, 333 (1983)
(uph olding residence requ irement for tuition-free public education). In Sosna v. Iowa, 4 19
U.S. 393, 407 ( 1975), the Court also upheld a one-year residence req uirement for divorce on
the ground that Iowa had an interest in avoiding extraterritorial attack on its divorce decrees.
l 68 Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533 (1944)).
The obliga tion is mirrored with respect to aliens by 42 U.S.C. § 198 1 (1988) which provides that "(a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State ... to make a nd enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishmen t, pains, penalties ... and to no other." M ost recent litigation has
focused on equality with white citizens. However, equality with white citizens was also contemplated . See Takahashi v. F ish & Game Comm'n, 334 U .S. 410, 41 9 (1948); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 11 8 U .S. 356, 369 (1886); Bhandari v. First Nat'! Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082,
1099, reh'g en bane, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Truax v. R aich, 239 U.S . 33, 39
( 1915) (legally admitted alien admitted "with the privilege of entering and abiding ... in any
State in the Union.").
169 Indeed , even if abo rti on were considered to be the equivalent of homicide, it seems
doubtful that a state could deny the advantages of its own law to out-of-state residents. Suppose that New Jersey recognizes a "battered wife" defense. It would plainly violate the privileges and im munities clause to make that defense available only where a New Jersey killing
was committed by New J ersey residents.
Assume further that Pennsylvania does not offer such a defense, and a Pennsylvania battered wife kills her Pennsylvania husband while on vacation in New Jersey . Would not the
pri vileges and immunities clause prevent New Jersey courts or legisla ture from denyin g the
defense to the non-resident wife in a New Jersey prosecu tion? (Conversely, if P ennsy lva nia
puni shes marital rape but New Jersey does not, New Jersey could not provide for the prosecution of on ly Pennsylvan ia husbands who rape their wives in New Jersey.) .
A general statute that all defend ants are to be governed by the law of their place of origi n
migh t raise different issues. Even so, in A ustin v. New Hampshire, 420 U .S. 656, 668 (1 97 5),
the Court held that "the constitutionality of one State's statutes affecting nonresidents [cannot]
depend upon the presen t configuration of the statutes of another State. " Mo re important ly, in
a crimina l context it is inconceivable that New Jersey would say conduct is governed "only"
by the law of the state of origin, for that could mean that a Pennsylvan ian coming into New
Jersey would be immu ne from New Jersey criminal sanctions.
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The Right to Travel: Constraints on Barriers to Entry and Exit

American citizens are entitled under article IV's privileges and immunities clause to avail themselves of reproductive options in neighboring states on a "footing of equality" with residents of those states; a
refusal by host states to accord such equality would violate the clause.
California could not deny women from Utah the right to obtain abortions that would be lawful for California citizens. To take advantage of
this entitlement, of course, a Utah woman must get to California. The
question thus arises, in light of Ireland 's recent efforts, whether California or Utah could prohibit women from traveling to California for that
purpose. One answer, as we have noted, lies in the commerce clause,
which limits the states' powers to interfere with interstate transit of persons and products. Yet the right to interstate travel has deeper roots. 170
T he predecessor of the privileges and immunities clause was contained in article IV of the A rticles of Confederation, which provided:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from
justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
free citizens in the several States; and the people of each state shall have
free ingress and regress to and from any other state . ... 171

Although there is little legislative history of this provision, it appears that
the Articles of Confederation generally sought to fuse disparate states
into a whole, not only by protecting a right to relocate one's residence to
another state, but by ensuring the ability to travel among the states for
purposes other than permanent migration. 172
A lthough the current privileges and immunities clause was modeled
on the Articles' provision, 173 it omits explicit mention of "free ingress
170 It is worth highlighting these roots in view of the Supreme Court's decision to rehear
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, Ill S. Ct. 1070 ( 199 1), and of the re-emergence of
state statutes which seek to impose durational residency requirements o n welfare benefits.
Given the limits of stare decisis in the Rehnquist court, Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U. S. 618
(1 969), may soon be relitigated. Cf. Nord linger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 ( 1992) (decl ining, on standing grounds, to reach right to travel challenge to "welcome stranger" ta x
assessment).
171 Articles of Confederation art. IV ( 1777) (emphasis added). Professor Bogen traces th e
ri ght to "ingress and regress" back to the Magna Carta and inter-colonia l movement. David S.
Bogen, the Privileges and Immuniti es Clause of A rticle IV, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 794, 8 1114 (1987).
172 The draft presented to the Continental Congress entitled inhabitants "going to res ide in
[] other State[s]" to the "ri ghts and privileges" of "natural born free Citizens" of their des tination. Bogen, supra note 171, at 820 n. 70 (citing 9 Journa ls of the Continental Congress 17741789, at 889 (W . Ford ed., 1907)). The Congress broadened the Article to protect the "privileges and immunities" of all free inhabitants in for eign states, not only those "goin g to reside."
173 Charles Pinckney, who claimed to have drafted article IV section 2 of the Constitution,
told the convention that this article was "formed exactly upon the princi ples of the 4th Article
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and regress." It has been accepted for the better part of two centuries,
however, that the current Constitution incorporates a right of interstate
travel. Initially, the right was rooted in the "ingress and regress" heritage of the Articles of Confederation embodied in the privileges and immunities clause of article IV. 17 4 The purpose of the privileges and
immunities clause, like its predecessor in the Articles of Confed eration,
was to recognize a national identity that made states fellow-members of a
broader polity. One of the constituents of that identity was the right of
citizens of each of the newly-formed United States to travel among the
states on a basis of equality.
The dimensions of this right formed part of the matrix for the controversy that swirled through the middle of the nineteenth century over
whether free blacks were citizens of the states in which they resided.
D uring the first half of the eighteenth century, many states sought to
exclude free blacks from their borders or to prevent their interstate
of the present Confederation." 3 Max Farrand, Th e Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, at 106, 112 (1937); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79 ( 1982) (O'Connor, J. concurring);
cf. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920) ("The text of Article IV, § 2, of the
Constitution makes manifest that it was drawn with reference to the corresponding clause of
the Articles of Confederation and was intended to perpetuate its limitations. "); SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-76 (1872) ("there can be but little question that the
purpose of both these provisions is the same," referring to the fourth article of the Articles of
Confederation and article IV of the Constitution).
174 The earliest assertion was that of Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (article IV privileges and immunities include "[t]he
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, o r otherwise"). See United Sta tes v. Wheeler, 254
U.S. 281, 297-98 (1920) ("Undoubtedly the right of citizens of the States to reside peacefully
in , and to have free ingress into and egress from, the several States (against both their own and
other states]" fused into one by article IV, section 2); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
4 18, 430 (1871) ("(T]he clause plainly and unmistaka bly secures and protects the right of a
citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in
lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation."); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
168 , 180 ( 1869), overruled on other grounds by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass' n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (privileges and immunities clause "gives (citizens of each state] the
right of free ingress into other States, and eg ress from them").
More recent opinions relyin g on the article IV heritage include: Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55 , 79 (1982) (O'Connor, J. concurring); Shapi ro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8
( 1969). Justices Stevens and Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's opinion in Attorney Gen. v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 , 920 (1986) (O'Con nor, J., dissenting) (article IV, section 2 provides
relevant basis for analysis in evaluating claims of right to interstate travel or migration), even
though Justice Rehnquist had previously rejected the analysis in Zobel, 457 U.S. at 84 n.3, on
the basis of the Slaughter-House objection. See text acco mpanying note 190 infra.
Professor David Bogen argues that a right to inters tate travel is implici t in the entitlement
to exercise privileges and immunities in the host state because "(i]f the state of origin prohibits
leaving, it will prevent a citizen from obtaining article IV privileges. Similarly if the state of
destination excludes the citizen, it also obstructs obtaining the privileges." Bogen, supra note
171, at 84 7. Whether or not the argument will support a generally applicable right to travel, it
certainly casts doubt on travel limitations that are designed to interfere with extraterritorial
abortion .
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travel. 175 It was conceded on all sides, however, that such efforts would
be impermissible if free blacks were state citizens. The issue was initially
tested in controversies over an 1821 South Carolina statute restricting
the rights of free black seamen to debark from their vessels while in port.
If blacks were "citizens," article IV was conceded by both North and
South to give them the right to travel into other states. 176
A decade later, arguments in the case of Prudence Crandall, who
was convicted of running a school for free black immigrants to Connecticut without a license, turned on whether the blacks were "citizens"; if so,
their right to immigrate was conceded by the prosecutors. 177 A ccording
to legal learning common at the time of the Civil War, state citizenship
entailed the right to travel among the states. 178 It was this understanding
175 See, e.g., Ill. Const. of 1848, art. XIV (requiring excl usi on of ''free persons of color"),
reprinted in Francis N . Thorpe, 2 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and
Other Organic Laws of the State, Territories and Colon ies Now or Heretofore Forming the
United States of America 1009 (1909); Ind. Const. of 1851, art. XIII, § 1 ("No negro or mulatto shall come into, or settle in the State"), reprinted in F. Thorpe, supra, at 1089; Mo.
Const. of 1820 Art III § 26, reprinted in F. Thorpe, supra, at 2154 (excluding "free negroes
and mulattoes"); Or. Const. of 1857, art. I, Bill of Rights, § 36 ("No free negro or mulatto ...
shall come, reside or be within this State"), reprinted in 5 F. Thorpe, supra, at 3000.
By the Civil War, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia all prohibited or punished by statute the entry of free blacks who were not already residents of the
state, and Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia prohibited free black residents from traveling outside of their own state with an intention to return.
See J. Hurd, supra note 49, at 279-80. Louisiana also sought to prohibit the travel of masters
with slaves to free states. P. Finkelman, supra note 38, at 211-12.
176 See House Comm. on Commerce, Report on Free Colored Seamen, H.R. Rep. No. 80,
27th Con g., 3d Sess. 2 ( 1843); The Reconstruction Amendments' Debates ii-iii (Alfred Avins
ed., 1967) [hereinafter The Reconstruction Amendm en ts' Debates]; Don E. Fehrenbacher,
Slavery, Law, and Politics 37-38 (1981); P. Finkelman, supra note 38, a t 233; J. Hurd, supra
note 49, at 279-80.
177 Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 344-47 (1 832); see Harold M. Hyman & William M.
Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law 94-95 (1982).
17 8 See Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 30 I, 304 (1 866) (invalidating Indiana's constitutional
prohibition on entry of blacks into the state, under article IV privileges and immunities clause,
holding that Dred Scali had been effectively overruled by, inter alia, Civi l Rights Act conferring citizenship); Case of Andrew Hatfield, 3 Western L. J ., Jul y 1846, at 477-78 (discharging,
under privileges and immunities clause, free black arrested for coming from Pennsy lvania to
Missouri without license); J. Hurd, supra note 49, at 279 ("So far as judicial opinion has been
expressed on the question, it seems almost unanimous that these laws would be unconstitutional, were negroes to be held citizens of a State."); cf. Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 510
(1846) (upholding sta tute to exclude free blacks as against A rticle IV attack on ground that
blacks could not be citizens); Tennessee v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (I Meigs) 331, 339, 341 (1838)
(conviction of free black for illegal immigration to Tennessee upheld against Article IV attack
on ground that blacks could not be citizens); id. at 333 (argument of At torney General conceding states "cannot pass laws to exclude citizens of one of the Component States"). Compare
Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (9 How.) 13, 18 (1852) (stating that states bordering slave states have
the right "to protect themselves against the influx either of liberated or fugitive slaves"), with
Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 610-11 (1860) (arguing that "any law which should attempt
to deny [citizens] free ingress or egress would be void," and explaining Moore, supra, as resting
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that gave particular salience to Justice Taney's strained conclusion in
Dred Scott that blacks could not become state or national citizens. 179
The understanding that citizenship brought with it the right to
travel among states was common currency in the political branches as
well. In 1821, Congress faced the question of whether to admit to the
Union the State of Missouri, whose constitution excluded from its
boundaries "free negroes and mulattoes." 180 If blacks could be citizens,
the constitution of Missouri would be inconsistent with the Constitution
of the United States. Congress ducked the issue; Missouri's admission
was secured by the adoption of a proviso recognizing that such exclusion
was applicable only to individuals who were not "citizens of the states in
the union," without defining whether blacks could be members of that
cla.ss. 181
Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott purported to resolve that issue. Still, in the 1858 and 1859 Congressional debates on the admission
of Oregon, the would-be state's draft constitutional provision excluding
all black persons from the state was challenged as a violation of article
IV. 18 2 In order to establish the validity of the restrictions, Oregon's successful proponents relied on Dred Scott's repressive conclusion that
on the proposition that slaves are not citizens). See also Willard v. People, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 461 ,
472 (1843) (the Law of Nations states that "the citizens of one government have a right of
passage through territory of another ... without the latter's acquiring any right over the
person or property .... Much less would we disregard their constitutional rights, as citizens of
one of the states, to all the rights, immunities and privileges of the citizens of the several
states"); Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 193, 194 (1833) (under article IV "it is the right of every
citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other state with his property of every
description, including negro slaves without being in any way subject to forfeit his property").
179 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,417 (1857) (Taney, J.) (if blacks were state
citizens, "it would give [them) the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased").
130 Mo. Const. of 1820 art. III, § 26, reprinted in 4 F. Thorpe, supra note 175, at 2154.
l SI See Joint Resolution of March 2, 1821, 16th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 Stat. 645, 645 (1821)
("No law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen, of either [sic) of the
states in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United States."); see also J.
Hurd, supra note 49, at 168, 280 (discussing Joint Resolution); Leon F. Litwack, North of
Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790-1860, at 34-39 (1961) (discussing "the legislative
debates of 1820-21 on the admission of Missouri" and "the matter of negro citizenship").
182 See Cong. Globe, 35th Cong. , 1st Sess. 1964 (1858) (statement of Sen. Fessenden of
Maine) (viewing prohibition on travel as unconstitutional); Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess.
952 ( 1859) (statement of Rep. Granger) (arguing that exclusion violates constitutional right
"of the people of one State going to another either on business or to remain there" under
privileges and immunities clause) (emphasis omitted); id. at 974 (statement of Rep. Dawes)
(exclusion is "plainly and ... palpably" unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities
clause); id. at 984 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (arguing that Oregon exclusion violates privileges and immunities clause; "[t]his guaranty of the Constitution of the United States is senseless and a mockery, if it does not limit State sovereignty and restrain each and every State from
closing its territory ... against citizens of the United States.").
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blacks could not be citizens. 183
In the aftermath of the Civil War, but before authoritative rejection
of Dred Scott, the Supreme Court reached beyond article IV to construe
the right to interstate travel as an element of political union. In striking
down a Nevada tax on railroad passengers leaving the state, the Court
adopted the views of Justice Taney:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was
formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all
citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community,
must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without
interruption, as freely as in our own States. 18 4

The fourteenth amendment was intended to provide explicit constitutional warrant for a right to travel that extended to both blacks and
whites, overturning the regime under which southern states excluded free
blacks and abolitionists. 18 5 The issue of state citizenship as a predicate
!83 Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., lst Sess. 1965 (1858) (statement of Sen. Douglas of Illinois)
(arguing that exclusions of blacks is permissible); Con g. Globe, 35th Con g., 2d Sess. 970 ( 1959)
(statement of Rep. Clark of Missouri) (relying on proposition in Dred Scott that "the negro is
not, and cannot be, a citizen of the United States," and, therefore, cannot claim privileges and
immunities).
184 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting) (quoted in
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48-49 (1868), as stating more clearly "the principles
here laid down"). Justice Rehnquist has commented approvingly on Crandall's use of inferences from the constitutional framework "that the power to obstruct totally the movements of
people is incompatible with the concept of one Nation ." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 441 ,
reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 ( 1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Charles Black, Structure
and Relationship in Constitutional Law 27-29 (1969) (explaining Crandall and Edwards: "the
fact that the United States is a single nation warrants inference as to mobility of population,
quite aside from strictly governmental needs .... [It is) a unitary nation, to which, because of
its nationhood, internal barriers to travel are unthinkable.").
A parallel protection was provided in the decade after Crandall by the interpretation of
the commerce clause which made the regulation of interstate transportation of passengers a
matter of national concern, while reserving under the police power the right to exclude "convicts, paupers, idiots, and lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge." Railroad
Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 , 471 (1877); see notes 123-27 and accompanying text supra.
The Crandall outcome in Nevada was prefigured by In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 162 (1858),
which enunciated a right to vacation with slaves in California on the ground that "this right of
free passage [is] a right that necessarily flows from the relation that the States sustain to each
other, under the general bond of the Union[.) We are one government, for certain specified
purposes; and is not the right of transit across the territory of a sister State one of the necessary
incidents of the purposes and ends for which the fed eral government was created?"
185 See, e.g., Chester J. Antieau, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment 33 ( 1981) ("The denial of the opportunity to move freely throughout the land was one of
the badges of servitude imposed upon the slave ... and, in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment the people intended that the privileges and immunities clause of that Amendment would
protect Blacks, as well as Whites, in their freedom to move and travel around the country,
without restriction by the States and their political subdivisions."); P. Finkelman, supra note
38, at 342-43 ("Perhaps the most important legacy of Aves, Dred Scott, Lemmon ... is [the
Fourteenth Amendment]. The men who witnessed these cases and others drafted an amendment that not only made freedmen citizens, but also demanded that their privileges and immu-
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for the article IV privileges was laid to rest with the fourteenth amendment's grant of residency-based state citizenship. After that grant, the
right to travel between states could not be denied to blacks on the ground
that they were not "citizens. " The Framers' expectation for the fourteenth amendment was that blacks, like other citizens, would be able to
lay claim under its aeg1s to the article IV right to interstate travel. 18 6
nities be respected nationwide .... In making the freedmen citizens of the states in which they
resided, the amendment ... required that the individual states recognize the rights of citizenship and therefore grant comity to bl acks entering from other sta tes. No longer could a southern state imprison a fr ee black sailor fr om the North or, indeed, prohibit free blacks from
enterin g their domain.").
!86 Senator Howard introduced the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment as an
amendment on the floor on May 30, 1866 to "settle the great question of citizenship and
remove all doubts as to what persons are or are not citizens of the U nited States." See Con g.
Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1 866) .
It was clear to all concerned that the status of citizenship wou ld entail a right to interstate
travel. Discussing Howard's amendment, Senator Cowan of Pennsylvania observed, "[a)s I
understand the rights of the States under the Constitution at present, California has the right,
if she deems it proper, to forbid the entrance into her territory of any person she chooses who
is not a citizen of some one of the United States. She cannot forbid [a citize n's] entrance." Id.
at 2891. Cowan argued against the amendment because he was "unwilling on the part of my
state to give up the ri ght ... of expelling [Gypsies]. " Id. Senator Conness of California
responded that California's efforts to curtail Chinese immigration had been struck down as
vi olating the commerce clause by the California Supreme Court. Id. at 2892.
Representative Bingham, drafter of the phrase "privil eges and immunities, " was on record as believing that citizenship entailed the right to interstate travel. See note 182 supra
(Bingham arguing that Oregon's exclusion of blacks violated their privileges and immunities as
citizens) .
Senator R everdy Johnson, who had represented the prevailing party in the Dred Scott
case, see The Reconstruction Amendments' D ebates, supra note 176, at xi, thought that Howa rd 's proposed definition of federal citizenship was both necessary and appropriate "if there
are to be citizens of the United States entitled everywhere to the character of citizens of the
United States. " See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. , 1st Sess. 2893 (1866). It is unclear whether this
is a reference to the article IV privileges or immunities to which citizens are "entitled" upon
traveling "everywhere" in the Union, and which Dred Scott had denied to blacks, or the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities. In the absence of the amendment, Johnson continued to maintain that the Civil Rights Bill exceeded Congress's powers. See id.
Others manifested similar understandings. See, e.g., id . at 4 75 (statement of Sen. Trumbull of Illinois, Chair of Judiciary Committee, draftsman of Civil Rights Act) ("A person who
is a citizen in one state ... is entitled to ... the right to travel, to go where he pl eases. This is a
ri ght which belongs to the ci tizen of each state. A law that does not allow a colored person to
go fr om one county to another is certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a freeman."); id.
at 1757 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (citi zen has a right "to go into any state in the union and
to reside the re, and the United States Government will protect him in that ri ght"); id. at 94142 (statement of Sen. Tru mbull) (objecting to pass system in Texas by which freedman found
at large without a pass is whipped); id . at 2765 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard of Michigan,
a uthor of Citizenship definition) (arguing that "right to pass through or reside in any state" is
among the "privileges and immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of
the Constitution") (quoting Corfield v. Coryell , 6 Fed. Cas., 547, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)); id.
at 497 (statement of Sen. Van Winkle, opposed to Civil Rights bill) (arguing that if blacks were
citizens, Indiana exclusion and other state exclusions would be illegal under article IV, and
concluding: "I think it needs a constitutional amendment to make these people citizens of the
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The fourteenth amendment went on to establish birthright citizenship in the nation, and explicitly to forbid states from "abridging" the
privileges or immunities of that national citizenship. National union entailed national citizenship as the primary allegiance, a fac t expressly recognized in the adoption of the citizenship clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The definition of state citizenship was derived from national citizenship: any United States citizen was ipso facto a citizen of the
state in which she resided. 187 Regardless of the vagaries of state law, the
United States citizen was protected against "abridgments of the privileges or immunities" of national citizenship.
Debate surrounding the privileges and immunities clause was
marked by references to the experience of Representative Samuel Hoar of
Massachusetts, which was notorious at the time in Republican circles. In
1844, Representative Hoar was dispatched from New England to South
Carolina to challenge that state's laws forbidding the entry of black
seamen. He was driven out of the state by threats of violence with the
connivance of South Carolina authorities, a result that was widely viewed
by Congressional Republicans as a violation of his rights as a national
citizen. 188 The protection of the fourteenth amendment's privileges and
immunities clause was designed in part to alleviate Congress's perceived
lack of power to enforce article IV's protection of the right to travel
freely among the states. 189
United States"); id. at 1082 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (suggesting that privileges or immunities clause was unnecessary, and arguing that exclusion by Illinois of free blacks violated article IV); id. at 1263 (statement of Rep. Broomall of Pennsyl vania) ("rights and immunities of
citizenship" denied by southern states to northerners included "right of transit" and "right of
domicile").
187 This was contrasted, in the debates on the definition of citizenship, with the preexisting
law by Senator Reverdy Johnson: "[a]s it now stands[,) ... [w)ho is a citizen of the United
States is an open question. The decision of the courts and the doctrine of commentators is that
every man who is a citizen of a state becomes ipso facto a citizen of the United States; but there
is no definition as to how citizenship can exist in the United States except through the medium
of a citizenship in a State." Id. at 2893.
188 P. Finkelman, supra note 38, at 109 n.28; H. Hyman & W. Wiecek, supra note 177, at
81 ; The Reconstruction Amendments' Debate, supra note 176, at 1-2, 4, 6-7 , 11-12; William
M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America 1760-1848, at 139-40
(1977).
189 See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sherman of Ohio)
(arguing that under article IV, "a man who was recognized as a citizen of one state had the
right to go anywhere within the United States and exercise the immunity of a citizen of the
United States; the trouble was with enforcing it .... This constitutional provision was in effect
a dead letter as to [Hoar)."); Cincinnati Commercial, Sept. 29, 1866, at I (Sherman, Speech of
29 Sept. 1866, in Cincinnati) ("Everybody born in this country or naturalized ... should have
the right to go from county to county and state to state."); see also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (arguing that Hoar had right to travel under
article IV privileges and immunities, but without enforcement it was to no avail); id. at 1066
(statement of Rep. Price) (arguing that goal of protecting privileges and immunities in early
draft of fourteenth amendment was to protect the "rights of citizens of one state in going into
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Subsequent case law has firmly established that one of the privileges
of national citizenship is the right to travel within the nation without
interference from its constituent subdivisions. 190 What is sometimes
overlooked, however, is that this protection is not rooted solely in inferences from constitutional structure, but stems directly from the concrete
expectations and historical experience of those who drafted and ratified
the fourteenth amendment.
Let us return to the example of a Utah woman who seeks to travel
ano ther"); Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 31, 1866, at 2, (Rep. Delano speaking at Coshocton,
Ohio, on Aug. 28, 1866) (amendment provides protect ion to right to travel in south, referring
to Hoar).
Some Republicans took the position that even without the fourt eenth amendment, article
IV protected ''fundamental rights which every citizen of the United States holds as gift of his
national government," among which were thought to be the right "to pass thro ugh or reside in
the State at pleasure." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., l st Sess. 1293 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger) (discussing bill protecting travelers' civil rights).
190 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("unquestioned historic recognition of the principle of free interstate migration " finds "its unmistakabl e essence
in that document that transformed a loose confederation of States into one Nation"); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1971) (right to travel is "fundamental personal right"); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 106-07 (1971) (right to pass fre ely from State to State protected by
national citizenship, although it does not necessarily rest on the fourteenth amendment); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) ("This Court long ago recognized that the nature
of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that
all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land. "); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ("A right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to
be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union."); id. at 764-67 (Harlan, J.) ("The right to
unimpeded interstate travel, regarded as privilege and immunity of national citizenship was
historically seen as a method of breaking down state provincialism, and facilitating the creation of a true federal union."); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J. ,
concurring) ("The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship."); id. at 185-86 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Rich or penniless, Duncan's citizenship under
the Constitution pledges his strength to the defense of California as a part of the United States,
and his right to migrate to any part of the land he must defend is something she must respect
under the same instrument."); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) ("right to pass
free ly from state to state" is a privilege of national citizenship); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S.
270, 274 (1900) ("Undoubtedly ... the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the
territory of any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment . ... "); SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 WalL) 36, 79 (1872) (rights recognized by Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (16 WalL) 35 (1867), are privileges of national citizenship); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 169,
180 (1869) (article IV gives citizens of each state the right of free ingress into other states and
egress fr om them), overruled on other grounds by United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944), quoted in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978), in Baldwin v.
Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978), in United States v. Wheeler, 254
U.S. 294, 295 (1921), in Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60,78 (1920), and in Blake
v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 ( 189 8)).
As a matter of statutory grant, the same privileges attach to aliens. 42 U.S. C. § 1981
(Supp. 1992) provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every state to ... make and enforce contracts ... as enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties ... and no other." If a state
is barred from interdicting travel by citizens, the "pains and penalties" of interdiction cannot
be inflicted on aliens within its jurisdiction. See note 168 supra.
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to California to obtain an abortion. Because of article IV's privileges and
immunities clause, the fourteenth amendment's own privileges and immunities clause, and the nature of national citizenship, California cannot
exclude prospective residents because they threaten to take advantage of
its employment opportunities 19 1 or welfare system. 192 Neither would it
be able to exclude residents of other states who travel to avail themselves
of its abortion laws.
On its own side of the border, Utah has no greater right to interfere.
In Crandall v. Nevada, 19 3 the Court held that Nevada could not tax residents leaving the state without interfering with the rights of national citizenship. Should Utah seek to emulate Irish efforts to prohibit its citizens
from leaving the state to obtain an abortion, the effort would be inconsistent with the Constitution's guarantees of interstate travel rights. 194
See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 163-64.
See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-31; cf. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
269-70 ( 1974) (conditioning indigent's right to non-emergency hospitalization on residency
requirements impermissibly impinges on right of interstate travel by denying newcomers basic
necessities of life).
193 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867).
194 Under current law, a substantial infringement of interstate travel rights is invalid unless
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (right to travel
cannot be penalized without "a compelling state interest") (emphasis in original); id. at 643-44
(Stewart, J. , concurring) (same). A nine month prohibition on departure from the state is
clearly a substantial infringement and at present, the state's interest in preventing previability
abortions is not compelling. Plann ed Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 , 2811-12, 2817
(1992). Indeed, the Casey dissenters seem to rely on claims that the abortion right is either
unprotected or not fundamental rather than that the fetal protection is compelling. Id. at
2860, 2867 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding abortion right "a form of liberty protected by"
but not classified as "fundamental" under due process clause of fourteenth amendment); id. at
2874 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The issue is whether [abortion] is a liberty protected by the
Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not. ").
In Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981), the Court held that while a "simple penalty for
leaving a State is plainly impermissible," the right to travel is necessarily qualified by a state's
right to prevent criminals from fleeing the jurisdiction. Id. at 421-22 and n.l8; cf. Zobel, 457
U.S. at 78-79 n.8 (O'Connor, J. , concurring) (substantial reason necessary for durational residency requirement); see also U .S. Canst. art. IV § 2, cl. 2. (extradition clause); New York v.
O'Neill, 359 U.S. I, 7 ( 1959) (detaining material witness in criminal proceeding justified "temporary interference with voluntary travel"). Thus, Jones upheld a Georgia statute which enhanced the penalty for child abandonment when the defendant left the jurisdiction after
committing the offense, on the theory that "if departure aggravates the consequences of conduct that is otherwise punishable, the state may treat the entire sequence of events from initial
offense to departure" as more serious. Jon es, 452 U.S. at 422-23.
Unlike the defendant who abandoned a child in Jones, a woman who seeks to leave Utah
to obtain an abortion has engaged in no "misconduct" in Utah that "qualifies her right to
interstate travel." Id. at 420. Nor would it warrant her extradition unless Utah has the constitutional power to punish a Utah resident for either obtaining a California abortion, or travelling through Utah to the border to obtain an abortion. As demonstrated elsewhere, Utah has
no power to punish the woman for wholly extraterritorial conduct. See Part I supra; Part IIA
supra; Part IIB(3) infra. The effort to prohibit travel toward the border would be in both
intent and effect an effort to prohibit the protected travel itself. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
19 1
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Constraints on Extraterritorial Prosecution

Article IV and the principles of federalism establish that California
may not deny a resident of Utah the "privilege" or " immunity" of obtaining an abortion that California extends to its own citizens. The Utah
citizen is "entitled" under article IV to the "privilege" of obtaining an
abortion on a basis of equality with the citizens of California. 19 5 The
whole point of national citizenship is that citizens of one state who enter
another are not aliens, but fe llow citizens of the nation, entitled to function on a basis of equality with native residents. As the modern Court
has articulated it, the purpose of article IV "was to help fuse into one
Nation a collection of independent sovereign states. It was designed to
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." 196 In light of this constitutional " entitlement," can Utah nonetheless adopt the stratagem tried in
German jurisdictions and prosecute its citizens for exercising their "entitlement" in California?
O n its face, article IV is directed impartially against any interference
with the privileges to which citizens are "entitled." The fact that Utah
would like to project its moral standards into California would be no
more cognizable a reason for denying Utah residents who venture into
California the "same privileges" as Californians than would be a desire
on the part of California to prevent an influx of Utah residents fleeing
local strictures. Utah and California are not independent sovereigns.
T hey lack the prerogatives granted under international law to define their
own citizenship, to exclude one another's citizens, and to limit the entitlements of immigrants and visitors from other states. The states of the
Union are, rather, members of a single nation. Any United States citizen
residing within a state's boundaries can demand recognition as a state
citizen. Any national citizen residing in another state can claim free entry and exit and the right to the privileges and immunities of fellow citizens rather than be forced to suffer the disabilities of an alien. 197 Just as
(9 Wheat.) I, 196 (1 824) ("Can a trading expedition between two adjoining states commence
and terminate outside of each? ... (the commerce power) must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several states.").
195 See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 n.ll (1985) (noting
that Court has never held that privileges and immunities clause protects only economic interests) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (state statute limiting in-state abortions to
residents violates privileges and immunities clause)).
196 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 ( 1948), quoted in Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1 988); in Piper, 470 U.S. at 279-80; in United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984); and in Zobel, 457 U .S. at 74
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
197 Cf. The Federalist No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It
may be esteemed the basis of the Union that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States."); see also Lemmon v. People, 20
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a California citizen is entitled, under the California Constitution's right
of privacy, to obtain an abortion, Utah cannot reduce the U tah citizen
who visits California to second class alien status.
This, indeed, was the New York judiciary's conclusion in the era of
national moral dissensus before the Civil War in People v. Merrill. 198 Despite the state's anti-slavery commitments, an effort to prosecute New
York residents who sold a free black man from New York in W ashington, D.C. was held to violate article IV, section 2:
The Constitution was intended to be binding, as it regards the rights of
the citizens of the several states, upon the people of the whol e union.
It was never intended that a legislature should violate state comity or
national rights, as the section in question does, by assuming to punish
as a felony a sale of property in a state or district where the right exists
by the laws of the locality to make such a sale. 19 9

If this conception of supervening national citizenship was, in some measure, disputed during the Union's first eight decades, the Civil War and
the Reconstruction amendments embedded it firmly in the national
structure. Whatever obligations a citizen owes to her home nation while
abroad in a foreign land, after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a state citizen, when in another state, cannot be regarded as an
alien. United States citizenship is "paramount and dominant instead of
being subordinate and derivative." 200
With the memory of the struggle for Union raw in the national consciousness, the Court set the course for future interpretation by articulating article IV's role in the federal system in no uncertain terms.
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the
citizens of each State upon the same footing with the citizens of other
States so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those
States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage
N .Y. 562, 607-09 (1860) (" No provision in [the Constitution] has so strongly tended to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this .... Every citizen of every other state
shall have the same privileges and immunities-that is the same rights-which the citizens of
that State possess . In the first place, they are not to be subj ected to any of the disabilities of
alienage .. . . The position that a citizen carries with him into every State into which he may
go the legal institutions of the one in which he was born cannot be supported. " ), cited with
approval in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S . (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U .S. 533 (1944).
198 2 Parker's Criminal Cases 590 (1855).
199 Id.
200 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 388-89; see also Edwards v. California, 31 4
U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson , J., concurring) ("This clause was adopted to make United
States citizenship the dominant and paramount allegiance among us."); Hague v. C.I.O., 307
U .S. 496, 510 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("The first sentence of the Amendment settled
the old controversy as to citizenship . ... Thenceforward citizenship of the United States
became primary and citizenship of a State secondary ."); note 186 supra (statement of Sen.
Reverdy Johnson).
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in other States ... it insures to them in other states the same freedom
possessed by citizens of those States .... It has been justly said that no
provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the
citizens of the United States one people as this. Indeed, without some
provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States .. . the Republic would have
constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists. 201

The goal of replacing a "league of states" with a "republic," comprised of "one people" whose allegiance is primarily national, requires
that American citizens who go from state to state should not be identifie d
as aliens by a personal law they carry with them from their home state.
Members of the national polity are Americans first and state citizens only
derivatively. As such, they are "entitled" by article IV to move from
state to state, and to take advantage of the local privileges and immunities "upon the same footing" with local residents. Efforts by their home
states to prevent the exercise of those privileges by prosecuting citizens
upon their return are destructive of the capacity to travel as free and
equal members of "one people." 2 0 2
This line of reasoning faces two sets of objections. The first is a
countervailing claim that federalism and article IV's full faith and credit
clause permit-and perhaps require-that state citizens be governed by
their home state law while out-of-state. California's article IV obligation
201 Paul, 75 U.S. at ISO. This passage was quoted with approval in Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988), in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978),
in Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1977), in United States v.
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 294, 295 (1921), and in Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78
(1920).
In State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 261 (N.C. 1892), the court held that an effort to prosecute a
North Carolina resident for a bigamous marriage contracted in South Carolina would be unconstitutional, commenting, "[t]he attempt to evade the organic law, by making the coming
into this state (after committing an offense in another) a crime is too palpable, in view of the
admitted fact that the constitution of the United States gives to citizens of all the states the
immunities and privileges of its own citizens .... " ld. at 264. See also Detroit v. Osborne,
135 U.S. 492, 498 (I 890) ("A citizen of another State going into Michigan may be entitled
under the federal Constitution to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of that State; but
under that Constitution he can claim no more. He walks the streets and highways in that
State, entitled to the same rights and protection, but none other, than those accorded by its
laws to its own citizens.").
202 This proposition does not necessarily mean that the home state can never exert the authority of its laws beyond its borders. Corporations, for example, cannot claim the protection
of the privileges and immunities clause. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 177-82. Furthermore, where a
home state's rules as to natural persons are identical with those of the foreign state, there is no
infringement of the "entitlement" to local privileges and immunities. Likewise, where the basic rules of conduct imposed by the home state are identical, differences in the rules regarding
loss allocation or contractual liability would not impair the basic commitment to establishing a
national citizenship. In cases of moral dissensus, however, the effort to impose home state
morality conflicts with the citizen's entitlement under article IV.
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to accord " full faith and credit" to Utah's restrictive laws might trump a
Utah citizen's article IV "entitlement" to California's privileges a nd immunities. 203 This objection suffers two defects, however. T o begin with,
it can be stood on its head. \rVhen Utah punishes its citizen for an action
California regards as protected, one could equally well argue that Utah
itself fails to grant full faith and credit to California's more permissive
"public acts." Indeed, commentators occasionally have taken the position that efforts at extraterritorial regulation of locally protected conduct
are violations of the full faith and credit clause. 204 More importantly,
settled law holds that " the full faith and credit clause does not require a
state to apply another state's law in violation of its own legitimate policy;" visiting citizens under the full faith and credit clause are generally
governed by laws implementing local policy. 205
T he second objection to the proposed interpretation of article IV is
somewhat better rooted in precedent. Advocates of this objection would
argue, relying on the Slaughter-House Cases, that when Utah prosecutes
its citizens for taking advantage of their article IV entitlements in California, there is no article IV violation because the privileges and immunities clause " does not profess to control the power of State governments
203 Since California cannot be required to waive its criminal regulatio ns for visitors, this
would mean that full faith applies only to the visitor's disadvantage. This is, to say the least,
an odd result given that th e privileges and immunities clause encompasses interstate equality.
204 See Kramer, supra note 79, at 1448 n.91, 145 1 n. l1l ( 1983) (asserting that the full faith
and credit clause limits the ability of states "to justify punishing citize ns for acts committed in
other states" ); Rollin Perkins, The T erritorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 Hastings L.J.
1155, 1164 (1971) ("California could not validly make it a crime for its citi zens to 'play the slot
machines' in Las Vegas, Nevada, where this is lawful. Such a statute would violate the full
faith and credit clause.").
Professor Laycock's recent account of the interplay among the full faith and credit clause,
the privileges and immunities clause, and the concepts of federalism does not take a direct
position on the validity of extraterritorial criminal prohibitions, but his analysis suggests their
invalidi ty under the full faith and credit clause. See Laycock, supra note 32. Under his view,
the full faith and credit clause imposes a requirement tha t "there are occasions when the law of
a sister state applies and occasions when it doesn't." Id . at 297, 327. He states, " [w]hen I fl y
from Texas to California, I knowingly leave the territory that Texas is em powered to gove rn
and submit myself to the authority of California," id. at 3 18, which appa rently would allo w a
visitor to take advantage of California's permissions as well as its prohibitions, because "[i]t is
no answer to say that I can usuall y comply with the more restrictive ru le, because that eliminates the political authority of the more permissive state." I d. at 319. F inall y, he emphasizes
that under his view of the federal system, a citizen does not "ca rry her own law with her like a
Roman citize n visiting the barbarians. " I d. a t 326.
205 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,422 (1979); see also Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1939) (" In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which
Congress has not prescribed, we think the conclusion is unavoidable th at the full faith and
credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons
and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state.") . Indeed, even earlier, the Court
held in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1 892), that the clause does not require enforcement of penal statutes.
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over the rights of its own citizens." 206 While the language has been repeated regularly, 207 the quotations have been in either dicta or dissent;
the language has only been grounds for one Supreme Court decision. 208
In recent years, Justice O'Connor-joined on occasion by both Justices
Brennan and Rehnquist-has manifested skepticism regarding the
soundness of this argument, at least insofar as it is invoked to uphold the
home state's efforts to interfere with the exercise of article IV's historical
privileges of "ingress and regress." 209
Justice O'Connor's skepticism is well-founded. T here is no textual
warrant for concluding that article IV's privileges and immunities clause
fails to bind a citizen's state of origin. T he rest of article IV is regularly
applied against a citizen's home state: the full faith and credit clause
would entitle a Utah citizen to enforce at home a judgment obtained in
California; the strictures of the extradition clause would protect a Utah
206 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S . (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873) (asserting that article IV's guarantee of privileges and immunities provided "no security for the citizen of the State in which
they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the State Governments over the rights of its own citizens").
207 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 84 n.3 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding article IV irrelevant to
right to travel claim, "for it appears settled that this clause neither limits federal power nor
prevents a State from distinguishing among its own citizens"); United States v. Wheeler, 254
U.S. 281,298 (1928) (holding article IV inapplicable to private action); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629, 643 (1883) (same); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898) (holding article
IV forbids priority to state residents in bankruptcy); cf. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v.
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1983) (citing Slaughter-House Cases for proposition that
New Jersey residents had no claim against New Jersey under the privileges and immunities
clause, but also citing O'Connor in Zobel); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.5 (1982) (discrimination
among residents not "the kind of discrimination against which the Privileges and Immunities
clause was designed to prevent"); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1942) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (implying that article IV does not apply to rules burdening domestic citizens).
Holmes' opinion in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 353 (1908), is
characteristically aphoristic. Although the syllabus characterizes it as asserting in the alternative that an article IV claim cannot "be raised by a citizen of the State itself," the opinion, after
denying that any violation of the clause exists goes on to make the statement "[b]ut this question does not concern the defendant, which is a New Jersey corporation." Id. at 358 . Since
corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause, it is hard to tell whether
Holmes is adverting to the fact that defendant is a corporation or a New Jersey corporation, or
both .
208 See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 138 (1872) (because "[t]he protection designed by
that clause, as has been repeatedly held, has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws
are complained of," an Illinois woman seeking admission to bar of Illinois could not claim that
exclusion of women violated article IV privileges and immunities).
209 Justice O'Connor's concurrence relied on her view that article IV applied to home-state
actions in Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74-75, to strike down Alaska's classifications among its residents
that imposed a disability on new residents who had "ventured into Alaska" from out of state.
Justice Brennan proffered support in his concurrence. Id. at 66. Justice O'Connor reiterated
her views in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist in Attorney General v. Soto
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 920 (1986). Cf. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 465 U.S. at 217-18
(Rehnquist, J., citing Justice O'Connor's Zobel concurrence with approval).

514

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 67:4-51

resident against improper extradition by his home government; the fugitive slave clause obligated a state of refuge to return the fugitive regardJess of the citizenship of the master.
The seemingly contrary language in the Slaughter-House Cases is
directed primarily to the question of whether the clause vests any rights
unrelated to interstate movement. Faced with the claim that Louisiana
butchers could invoke "privileges and immunities" against a Louisiana
statute regulating actions in Louisiana, the Slaughter-House Court rejected the notion that a citizen can claim this constitutional protection of
an undefined set of natural rights against the laws of her own state. 2 10
The Court's opinion, however, does not speak to the situation where
claims of interstate migration or travel are at issue. 2 11
A flat rule that a citizen holds no article IV "entitlements" against
her home state would be understandable if the sole value protected by the
clause were a concern for bias against non-residents arising from the fact
that "nonresidents are not represented in the . . . legislative halls. " 212
Any state resident subjected to an objectionable rule by her home state
has, of course, the opportunity to seek redress from her state legislators.
Slaugl11er-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77 .
The quoted language from the Slaughter-House Cases is followed by the comment that
the clause's "sole purpose was to declare to the several states that whatever those righ ts are as
you grant o r establish them to yo ur own citizens, ... the same, neither more nor less, shall be
the measure of the rights of citizens of other states within yo ur jurisdiction." I d. at 77.
As Justice Roberts articulated the matter in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939),
"(a)t one time it was thought that this section recognized a group of rights wh ich, acco rding to
the jurisprudence of the day, were classed ' natural rights;' ... guaranteeing the citizens of
every State the recognition of this group of rights by every other State .... It has come to be
the settled view that Article IV § 2 [guarantees) ... that in any State every citizen of any other
State is to have the same privileges and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy ." See
also Bogen, supra note 171 , at 850-51 ("If citizens of a state were to be protected on ly in states
where they were not citizens, the article should have used the phrase 'in any other of the
states.' ... [Recognition of a right to travel) would not necessarily revive fu ndamental rights
analysis" which troubled the Slaughter-House majority.).
212 Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975); see Baldwin v. Montana Fish &
Game Comm'n., 436 U.S. 371, 402 (1978) (Brennan, J., di~senting) (quoting Austin); United
Bldg. & Constr. Trade, 465 U.S. at 2 17 ("New Jersey residents have no claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause .... But New Jersey residents at least have a chance to remedy
at the polls any discrimination against them. Out-of-state citizens have no similar opportunity.").
This conception has i.Jeen at the core of D ean Ely's vision of the clause. See generally
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 83, 90-91 (1980); John Hart Ely , Choice of Law and
the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 173, 189-9! (19 81) [herein after Ely, Choice of Law). See also Gary Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and
the Priv ileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 384 (1979) (arguing that laws disadvantaging nonresidents epitomize government without consent of governed); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Note, State Parochialism, the R ight to Travel and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1568, 15 86 ( 1989) (arguin g that
traditional view of privileges and immunities clause as protecting "only current nonresidents"
is problematic).
210
211
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But, as the history of the clause makes manifest, concern with the political vulnerabilities of out-of-staters does not exhaust the purposes of the
clause, designed as it was to "fuse into one nation a collection of independent sovereign states" and to "constitute the citizens of the United
States one people. "21 3
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper , the Court held that
New Hampshire's exclusion of a Vermont citizen from legal practice on
grounds of non-residency violated the privileges and immumtles
clause. 2 14 If one took seriously the Slaughter-House dictum that the
21 3 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall. ) 168, 180 (1869), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass 'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Court has in recent years
remarked on the "mutually reinforcing relationship between the privileges and immunities
cl ause of article IV, section 2 and th e commerce clause-a relationship that stems from their
comm on origin in the fourth Article of Confederation and their mutual commitment to the
proposition that 'in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.' "
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 51 8, 534 (1 978); see also Baldwin , 436 U.S. at 379-80 (common
origin of commerce and privileges and immunities clauses); id. at 383 (distinctions prohibited
where they " hinder the form a ti on, purpose or development of a single Union of those sta tes";
immunities protected which " bear upo n the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" ); Austin v.
Ne w Ha mpshire, 420 U. S. 656, 66 1 ( 1975) (describing "force of the clause in fashioning a
sin gle nation").
My erstwhile colleague Ge rald L. Neuman articulated the point with characteristi c
clarity:
[T]he Court has interpreted the privileges and immunities clause as serving a broader
purpose than merely compensa ting for lack of representation .... Both the wording of
th e clause and its interpretatio n suggest as a paradigm the right of a citizen of state A,
while physically within the bord ers of state B, to interact with citizens of state B on the
same legal terms as those that govern their interaction among themselves .... Nonresidents who are known to carry their domicile's Jaw with them cannot participate as
equals in the life of the state.
Ge rald Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection and Self-Determination, 135 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 261, 320-24 (1 987) (footnotes omitted); see also Douglas Laycock, Equality and
the Citizens of Sister States, 15 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 431, 438-39 ( 1987); Laycock, supra note 32,
at 261-66 ("The Clause is first and fo remost a national unity provision" with the dual purpose
of " achieving national unity and preserving states as separate polities."); Jonathan Varat, State
"Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 518-19 (1981) ("The framers
adopted the constitutional ban on state discrimination against non-residents primarily as an
instrum ent of national unifica tion. [It] fosters cumulative attachment among people in different states ... and leaves people free to make their home in one state without sacrificing the
opportunity to share in the bounty found in others. " ).
Dean John Ely acknowledges, despite his affinity for the " representation " theory, see Ely,
Choice of Law, supra note 2 12, at 191 , that "one might maintain that Article IV's general goal
of making us more one nation is sufficiently disserved by gearing choice of Jaw determinations
to residence ... to justify invalidating such references under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause," but views this as better cha racterized as an argument that there is "something somehow out of accord with ... our small 'c'onstitution--Dut of accord in particular with the
reasons we as a nation decided to supersede the Articles of Confederation." I d. at 192.
Professor Tribe also seems sympathetic to Justice O'Connor's position. See Laurence
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 542-43 , 545 (2d ed. 1988) (viewing a "national cohesion"
argum ent as a crucial element of article IV, although he retains the claim that the "core concern" of a1ticle IV is "the protection of outsiders").
2 14 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985). In Barnard v. Thorstenn , 489 U.S. 546, 557-59 (1989), it
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clause does not "control the power of State governments over the rights
of its own citizens," 2 15 New H ampshire likely could achieve an identical
Balkanization by simply showing respect for the professional monopoly
of the Vermont bar. New H ampshire could induce Vermont to prohibit
its attorneys from practicing in New Hampshire in exchange for itself
forbidding local attorneys fro m practicing in Vermont. Such an incentive to reciprocal protectionism is the precise opposite of the goal of "fusing the states into one nation ." 2 16
The outcome would be one that directly burdens only those who are
"represented in the legislative halls." The Court, however, has twice
held that the mere fact that the disadvantage an out-of-state resident suffers can be cured by actions in her home state is insufficient to avoid a
privileges and immunities challenge: " [a] State may not barter away the
right, conferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of t he U nited
States, to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens when they go
applied the same principle to invalidate a similar residency requirement in the Virgin Islands,
and in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 70 (19 88), it invalidated a refusal
to admit non-residents to the bar "on motion."
2 15 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 ( 1872).
216 The public-choice style anal ysis is this: the sellers in each state gain more from the
preservation of a local monopoly than they lose from foregoing the opportunity to trade in
other states. If one assumes that the con centrated bar or interest groups can predominate over
the diffuse consumer interest, the fact that the consumers in both states lose from the Balkanization does not make the outcome improbable.
On a slightly different tack, the Court struck down a statute requiring out-of-state residents to obtain a license not required of Maryland residents before offerin g goods for sale in
Maryland. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 41 8, 430 (1870). From the privileges a nd
immunities clause, said the Court, "it fo llows that the defendant might lawfully sell ... any
goods which the permanent residents of the State might sell." I d.
Another provision of the Maryla nd law prohibited both residents and non-residents from
permitting unlicensed non-residents to sell goods at their "store, warehouse or place of business." Id . at 420, 424. Is it conceivable that the outcome would have been different if the case
had come up as an appeal from conviction of a Maryland resident allowin g her warehouse to
be used rather than as an appeal from con viction of a New Jersey resident offering harnesses
for unlicensed sale? If not, then it can hardl y be the case that article IV cannot give rights
against one's home state.
Professor Kramer's analysis of the clause, see Larry Kramer, Myth of the Unprovided-for
Case, 75 Va . L. Rev . 1045, 1066 (19 89), views the "central purpose" of the clause as "reducing
interstate friction," and takes the position that "the privileges and imm unities clause does no t
require State A to extend the benefit of its law to a State B resident if State B wants State B law
applied." Thus, ignoring the fact that avoidance of intersta te friction was viewed as a means to
national unity, K ramer, apparently, wo uld a llow reciprocal protectionism, as well as home
state prohibitions on travel.
On the other hand, Professor Gergen 's suggestion in The Selfi sh State and the Market, 66
Tex. L. Rev. 1097, 1128 (1988), that "the Framers sought by the pri vileges and immunities
clause only to ensure outsiders the right to engage in trade and commerce free from discriminatory tax or regulatory burdens," altho ugh at odds with the text of the clause and the "ingress and egress" heritage generally ack nowledged in the half century after the framing, would
appear to prevent reciprocal barriers.
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into other States. " 217 Even less should it be able to prohibit directly the
enjoyment of those privileges and immunities.
Moreover, even if we take the Slaughter-House dictum at face value,
the efforts of Utah to prosecute her residents upon return must still deal
with the S laughter-House holding: that the fourteenth amendment's proh ibition of abridging the " privileges or immunities of citizens" protects
the rights which "owe their existence to the Federal government, its N ational character, its Constitution or its laws." 2 18 The example of such a
right given in the Slaughter-House Cases was the right to travel recognized in Crandall v. Nevada. 2 19
T he "entitlement" of Utah residents under article IV to obtain an
abortion in California on a basis of equality with Californians is also a
right which "owe[s its] existence to ... the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution." U tah's effort to prevent its citizens
from taking advantage of that entitlement by prosecuting them for doing
so, even if it does not violate article IV, would "abridge" that entitlement
in violation of Utah's obligations under the fourteenth amendment. 220
This was the reasoning in Colgate v. Harvey, 221 where a majority of
the Court struck down a Vermont statute imposing a higher tax on income from out-of-state investments.
The right of a citizen of the United States to engage in business, ... or
to make a lawful loan of money in any state other than that in which
the citizen resides is a privilege equally attributable to his national citizenship. A state law prohibiting the exercise of these rights in another
state would, therefore, be invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment
. .. . The purpose of (the article IV privileges and immunities clause]
was to require each state to accord equality of treatment to the citizens
of other states .. .. One purpose and effect of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, read in light of this interpretation, was to bridge the gap left by that article so as also to
safeguard citizens of the United States against any legislation of their
own states .. . . (When] a citizen of the United States residing inVermont goes into New Hampshire, he does not enter foreign territory,
but passes from one field into another field of the same national domain. When he trades, buys or sells . . . across the state line, when he
... exercises rights of national citizenship which the law of neither
217 A ustin v. Ne w H ampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 667 (1975) (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne
Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 82 ( 1920)).
21 8 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
21 9 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868).
220 Cf. Bogen, supra note 171, at 849 ("As a right secured by Article IV to all citizens,
under the Fourteenth Amendment [the right to travel] is also a privilege and immunities [sic]
of Uni ted States citi zenship.").
221 296 U.S. 404, 431 (1936).
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The holding of Colgate was a casualty of the N ew Deal Court; the
decision was overruled four years later in Madden v. Kentucky, 223 a case
which upheld a differential tax on out-of-state bank deposits. The demise
of Colgate's reasoning is less clear. The lvfadden Court reaffirmed that
the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause extends " to
rights which are inherent in national citizenship, " 224 but, invoking the
reluctance of the Court to " restrict the power of the states to manage
their own fiscal affairs," held that "the right to carry out an incident to a
trade, business or calling such as the deposit of money in banks is not a
privilege of national citizenship." 225 If, with Justice O' Connor, we reaffirm the "ingress and regress" heritage of article IV as inherent in national citizenship, then the specific rejection of Colgate on the ground
that "an incident to a trade" is not a privilege of national citizenship
222 Id. at 430-31 , 433. Justice Stone's dissent, joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo,
denied that the " movement of persons across state lines" for purposes other than national
business was a privilege of national citizenship protected by the fourteenth a mendment. See id.
at 445. In the alternative, the dissent denied that the "privilege of acquiring .. . investments
without the state is a privilege of federal ci ti ze nship," id. at 447, on the ground that a tax on
in ves tment " has no necessary relation to his mo vements interstate."
Justice Stone also sought to rely on Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 278 (1900), which
upheld against a fourt eenth amendment challenge a Georgia tax on persons hiring laborers
employed outside of the state. The Court in Fears, however, relied on the fact that the tax was
comparable to taxes levied on other occupations, and that " the intention to prohibit this particular business cannot properly be imputed from the amount of the tax payable." Id. at 275.
223 309 U .S. 83 (1940), overruling Colgate v. H arvey, 269 U.S. 404 (1 93 6).
224 Id . at 91 ; see also Snowden v. Hughes, 32 1 U .S. 1, 6-7 (1 944) (citing Madden for proposi tion that " [t)he protection extended to citizens of the United States by the privileges and
immunities clause includes those rights and privileges which, under the laws and Constitution
of the United States, are incident to citizenship of the United States, but does not include
rights perta ining to state citizenship and derived solely from the relationship of the citizen and
his state established by state law").
225 Id. at 92-93. This reading finds support in Justice Douglas' concurrence in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S . 226, 250 (1964):
There has been a judicial reluctance to ex pand the content of national citizenship beyond
racia l discrimina tion, voting rights, the right to travel, safe custody in the hands of a
federal marshal, diplomatic protection abroad, and the like. See Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S . (16 Wall.) 36 (1 872); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States
v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 ( 1941); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (195 8). The reluctance has been due to a fear of creating constitutional refuges for a host of rights historically subject to regulation. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U .S. 83 (1940), overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935). But those
fears have no relevance here, where we deal with Amendments whose domina nt purpose
was to guarantee the freedom of the slave race and establish a regime where national
citizenship has only one class.
Cf. Head v. New Mex ico Board, 374 U .S. 424, 433 n. 12 (1 963) (upholding New Mexico's
prohibition on New Mexico radio station broadcasting from New Mexico advertisements of
Texas optometrist, and asserting that "[t)he Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a naked right to conduct a business free of otherwise valid
state regulation").
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ieaves un touched Colgate's reasoning that a home state's efforts to interfere with interstate equality impinge on the fourteenth amendment rights
of national citizenship. 22 6
CONCLUSION

In a federal republic which takes seriously the claims of state sovereignty, we must expect and indeed revel in variations in moral commitments from state to state. But the federal system , as it has been
understood since the founding of our republic, demands that the moral
commitments of each state be tempered by a regard for the commitments
of its neighbors; the moral sovereignty of each state ends at its borders.
From the founding, this limitation was understood not only as protection
for state prerogatives, but for individmd liberty. The effo rt to prosecute a
citizen at home for taking advantage of the options permitted by a sister
state is at odds with this understanding of federalism .
Equally important, the American Constitution as reformulated after
the Civil War contemplates a national citizenship which gives to each of
its members the right to travel to other states where, on a basis of equality with local residents, they can take advantage of the economic, cultural and moral options permitted there. The effort of any political
subdivision of the nation to coerce its citizens into abjuring the opportunities offered by its neighbors is an affront not only to the federal system,
but to the rights that the citizens hold as members of the nation itself.
T he right to travel to more hospitable environs could not, after the fourteenth amendment, be denied to former slaves seeking a better life.
U nder the same principles, even if R oe continues to erode or is ultimately
overruled, that right cannot be denied to women seeking to choose their
future.
226 The reluctance in Edwards to reaffirm Crandall as a national citizenship case also seems
to be a thing of the past. Even if article IV does not by itself protect against ab ridgment by a
home state, it is perfectly plausible to argue for such protection of citize ns travelling in other
states from the structure of nati onal citizenship contemplated by the constitutional design ,
including the fourteenth amendment's citizens hip clause. See, e.g ., United States v. Wheeler,
254 U.S. 281, 299 ( 1921) ("Nor is the situation changed by assuming that ... a State has the
power by depri ving its own citizens of the right to reside peacefully therein and to free ingress
thereto and egress therefrom . . . . The proposition assumes that a State could, without violating the fund amental limitations of the Constitution other than those of A rticle IV enact legislation incompatible with its existence as a fre e government and destructive of the fundamental
ri gh ts of its citizens ... the existence of fed eral power to detriment the repugnancy of such
ac tion to the Constitution is not disputed." ); Ely, Choice of Law, supra note 212, at 19 1-93
(arguing that general goals of article IV of "making us more one nation" and "the reasons we
as a nation decided to supercede [sic] the Art icles of Confederation" are inconsistent with "a
system of 'personal law' wherein people carry their home states' legal regimes aro und with
them" ).

